

Perspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11



Report to Congress

Of the

**Local, State, Tribal, and Federal
Preparedness Task Force**

September 2010

Message from the Task Force

Members of Congress,

On behalf of the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force (“Task Force”), we are pleased to present for your consideration our report *Perspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11* (“Report”). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) assisted in preparing the Report to meet legislative requirements set forth in the *Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010* (P.L. 111-83).

Those requirements brought together 36 distinguished Task Force members representing local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments from across the Nation, as well as 25 *ex officio* members representing Federal departments and agencies, to collaboratively take stock of national preparedness and provide recommendations for improvement. The Report reflects members’ consensus opinion about where America stands today in terms of preparedness for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other hazards. Bold, innovative improvement ideas are offered in conjunction with carefully considered refinements to the existing preparedness landscape.

We found the state of preparedness to be positive, with continual, significant signs of improvement since the September 11, 2001 attacks (“9/11”) painfully catalyzed the imperative for reform of what is now known as homeland security. Some of the success can be attributed to the increasingly mature integration of civil defense and emergency management activities, whose origins long predate 9/11, while others are refinements to that foundation based on lessons learned from specific events, such as Hurricane Katrina. But we also found that, while we intuitively recognize the strides made in preparedness, we remain unable to effectively identify and achieve preparedness objectives in a prioritized, measurable way, which limits cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability.

We are proud that the Task Force was among the first whose membership reflects the collaborative, intergovernmental spectrum of stakeholders who conduct preparedness activities necessary to achieve a secure, resilient Nation. Equally important is the fact that the recommendations are truly independent; they were not officially approved by DHS or other Federal departments and agencies in advance of transmittal to Congress, though many members of the Federal Government participated directly as *ex officio* members.

It is appropriate that the Report be completed in September—Preparedness Month—and we hope our recommendations will assist Congress to oversee national preparedness. We believe that our recommendations will improve our Nation’s ability to determine preparedness priorities, investments, and measuring progress. In addition, we believe that we have determined a means to consistently and predictably involve local, State, Tribal, Territorial, non-governmental, and private sector organizations in preparedness policy development. To that end, the Report is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
Interim Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable George V. Voinovich
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable David E. Price
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Harold Rogers
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

On behalf of our colleagues, we, the Working Group Chairs, appreciate the opportunity to contribute this intergovernmental perspective to Congress and look forward to continued improvement in the Nation's preparedness.

Sincerely,



Nicholas L. Crossley, CEM
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Johnson County, Kansas




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
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
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- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Office of the Secretary

Department of Education

Department of Energy

Environmental Protection Agency

General Services Administration

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Homeland Security

- United States Coast Guard
- Customs and Border Protection
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

- Transportation Security Administration

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Department of the Interior

Department of Justice

- Office of the Deputy Attorney General

- Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Acknowledgements

The Task Force thanks the numerous contributors who assisted in its mission and devoted their time to the development of the Report, especially Timothy Manning and Juliette Kayyem for administering and supporting the work of the Task Force in accordance with P.L. 111-83. Officials and subject-matter experts who contributed their perspectives on local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness efforts include:

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Numerous private sector, non-governmental organizations, and DHS components assisted the Task Force to broaden and augment its deliberations by hosting meetings, provided insights and suggestions, or facilitating other outreach efforts. In particular, we would like to thank the following individuals and organizations: Ann Beauchesne and Vincent Femia of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; James Caverly and Barbara Yagerman of the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection Partnership and Outreach Division; Leslie Luke and San Diego Business Alliance members; Jannah Scott and Marcus Coleman of the DHS Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives; the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security; the DHS Office of Public Affairs; and the DHS Private Sector Office.

In addition, the Task Force greatly valued the generous expertise and assistance provided by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) in Monterey, California. CHDS director Glen Woodbury and faculty members Lauren Fernandez, Ellen Gordon, and Dawn Wilson

served as thought-provoking facilitators who ably guided the members through the challenging scope of the Task Force deliberations. CHDS also provided extensive online collaboration resources to assist members' deliberations, working group meetings, internal communications, and research.

The Task Force would like to thank the support team that includes Matthew Biancucci, Jeffrey Clarke, Robert Heilen, Erik Iverson, Sean McLaughlin, Emily Ohland, Susan Rabil, Michael Reid, Stephanie Shaffer, and Katherine Stafford. These individuals provided critical administrative, research, and analytical support.

Finally, the Task Force thanks the City of Boston, the City of Chicago, the City of San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. for graciously hosting the Task Force during its meetings and providing perspective on efforts to ensure the safety and resiliency of their communities.

Executive Summary

P*erspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11* (“Report”) presents recommendations on national preparedness from the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force (“Task Force”). At the request of Congress, the Task Force brought together 36 members representing a range of disciplines and perspectives from across local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments. Together with 25 *ex officio* members representing Federal departments and agencies, we worked collaboratively to take stock of national preparedness and provide recommendations for improvement.

In accordance with our congressional mandate, we independently undertook a series of analytical activities, including:

- Considering what “preparedness” has meant in the United States both historically and since the 9/11 attacks;
- Reviewing post-9/11 preparedness-related activities to understand achievements to date and remaining areas of concern, with a particular emphasis on cost-effectiveness and efficiency; and
- Proposing recommendations to improve national preparedness outcomes.

Our discussions focused on four main areas, as we considered: 1) the **strategic investments** needed to improve the cost effectiveness and efficiency of achieving preparedness outcomes; 2) the **policy and guidance** that outline desired national preparedness goals and objectives; 3) **capabilities and assessments** employed to measure success in achieving preparedness outcomes; and 4) the preparedness **grant administration** which provides funding to develop and sustain capabilities.

In addition to the experience and expertise housed in the Task Force itself, we sought additional perspectives through outreach to non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and the public. We solicited innovative ideas from the private sector and general public through a web-based National Dialogue on Preparedness which enabled thousands of stakeholders around the country to submit and vote on stakeholder-initiated recommendations.

Preparedness in Historical Context

While “preparedness” has taken on a new meaning and urgency since the attacks of 9/11, we wish to emphasize the strong historical roots of preparedness that long pre-date 9/11. Historical concepts of preparedness include a range of contexts—from military organizations to the Scouting movement’s emphasis on individual self-sufficiency. National-level conceptions of preparedness emerged following World War II as the Nation adopted civil defense and citizen preparedness as a national imperative and embraced the shared responsibilities of both Federal and non-Federal stakeholders. Importantly, our historical review describes how preparedness has been variously embraced as a philosophy, a goal, a distinct mission, a functional process, or some combination of these. These historical roots and debates regarding preparedness served as the foundation for the rapid evolution of national-level approaches to preparedness following the 9/11 attacks.

Preparedness Evolutions and Accomplishments Since 9/11

The years following the 9/11 attacks have seen dramatic national efforts to re-prioritize concepts of national preparedness. We believe that Congress rightfully cites the tremendous improvements in national preparedness since 9/11, and our analyses revealed significant progress in preparedness for all hazards at all levels of government.

Policy and Guidance: All levels of government have worked to develop and implement preparedness policy and guidance. Federal initiatives—such as national strategy documents, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and national guidelines—have helped to create a common framework and language for homeland security and emergency management. Several non-Federal efforts—such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)—have likewise evolved and strengthened.

Capabilities and Assessments: Similarly, the Federal Government has worked with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to identify key homeland security and emergency management capabilities, as outlined in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). All levels of government are working to integrate these capabilities into assessment frameworks that identify gaps and resource needs. Federal efforts, like the TCL, are also increasingly integrating existing local, State, Tribal, and Territorial homeland security and emergency management standards, such as those of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).

Grant Administration: Grant-based investments dramatically increased the capabilities of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial authorities which, in many cases, previously possessed limited capability. Grant funds have supported development and sustainment of emergency operations centers, interoperable communications systems, information and intelligence sharing mechanisms, specialized response assets, and a myriad of planning initiatives focused on everything from mitigation and incident management to long-term recovery.

Together, these efforts have moved all levels of government toward recognition of mutual responsibility for national preparedness. Shared goals and systems, while perhaps not fully realized, are now part of the preparedness landscape. The ultimate result is that no informed observer can seriously doubt that America is better prepared for disasters today than it was prior to 9/11.

Remaining Challenges and Recommendations

While we acknowledge the significant preparedness-related progress made to date, we have identified a series of challenges that remain and proposed recommendations to address them. Many of our recommendations can be addressed by local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal partners within existing authorities. Where our recommendations conflict with existing law, authorities, or policy, we advocate changes to those respective laws, authorities, or policies.

Strategic Investments: Congressional language establishing the Task Force reflects shared concerns about the cost-effectiveness of preparedness investments as well as more emergent concerns regarding long-term sustainability of these investments. We identified that there are a growing number of complex and emergent preparedness issues that will continue to challenge the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of the current preparedness system.

We believe that the Nation can effectively lower the long-term cost of preparedness by investing early in cost-reducing measures in key areas. Accordingly, we recommend that all levels of government consider bold, innovative investments to increase long-term cost-effectiveness and sustainability.

Particularly, we emphasize recommendations that will:

- Improve the ability to strategically forecast emerging preparedness requirements and associated policies and/or capabilities;

- Enable school districts to integrate preparedness principles into existing curricula, promoting a “culture of preparedness;”
- Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies;
- Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and magnitude of disaster recovery; and
- Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness implications.

Policy and Guidance: Since 9/11, the Federal Government has played the lead role in developing and promulgating national-level preparedness policy and guidance. Federal policy-makers have an admittedly mixed record in integrating local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives into federally developed policy and guidance. There is no consistent, standardized way for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to meaningfully influence the preparedness policy process.

We therefore recommend that DHS transform advisory bodies into a networked preparedness policy advisory system. This approach will enable non-Federal stakeholders to meaningfully influence preparedness policy from initiation to implementation.

Our specific recommendations are to:

- Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council (NAC);
- Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) so they serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that communicates regional perspectives and informs national-level policy and guidance;
- Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate (NPD);
- Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process that balances DHS’s need for policy-making flexibility with its need to engage broader homeland security and emergency management stakeholders into the policy-making process;
- Ensure that planning-related policy and guidance necessitate that basic emergency plans match community demographics;
- Establish and fund a national comprehensive mutual aid system based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to enable all levels of government to tap into assets and capabilities around the country before, during, and after incidents; and
- Develop a strategic policy planning process that prepares for future challenges by performing long-range assessments.

Capabilities and Assessments: We uniformly believe that our Nation is significantly better prepared than it was on September 11, 2001—each of us has significant anecdotal data, unique to our jurisdictions, to support this premise. Yet we acknowledge that while stakeholders across the Nation have been working to improve preparedness, specific, measurable outcomes for these efforts have yet to be defined and assessed.

We believe that all levels of government must support development and phased implementation of a national preparedness assessment framework. We have a vision for how this framework should work: defining threats and hazards; describing capability outcomes; typing and inventorying assets; determining

risk-based levels of capability; and establishing more meaningful outcome-focused assessment measures. This framework should be an enduring, collaborative construct, with continuing system improvements made as capability outcomes and measures become better defined into the future.

Our specific recommendations are to:

- Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation for the justification of preparedness improvements;
- Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List (TCL) with tiered, capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements into Capability Level Guidance;
- Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security and emergency management assets;
- Employ existing, familiar, user-friendly systems to collect preparedness assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government; and
- Implement the elements of this preparedness assessment framework over a three-year period, with an integrated set of annual milestones to demonstrate ongoing progress.

Grant Administration: Preparedness grants have been critical to helping local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments build and sustain capabilities. Mirroring the challenges identified in other areas, the effectiveness and efficiency of preparedness grant programs are hindered by limited intergovernmental coordination and collaboration, unsynchronized processes, and insufficient linkages with capability assessments. Accordingly, we believe that targeted improvements are necessary to the administration of preparedness grants.

Our specific recommendations are to:

- Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the Federal level;
- Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding preparedness-related grant funds;
- Have DHS evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal grants to ensure that these requirements do not dis-incentivize local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment;
- Ensure that Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions apply consistent standards;
- Allow grantees flexibility to use Federal grant funds to support maintenance and sustainment costs without limitation;
- Allocate grant funding using a variety of approaches, including block grants, risk-based grants, category/program-specific grants, and competitive grants; and
- More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.

We believe that by implementing these recommendations, the ultimate outcome will be a preparedness system that is better defined, better integrated, more effective and sustainable, and that better reflects the core principles of shared responsibility among local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal governments.

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Task Force members deliberate in a meeting held in Washington, DC (FEMA/Bill Koplit).

Legislative Mandate and Task Force Methodology

P*erspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11* (“Report”) presents recommendations to Congress on national preparedness for homeland security and emergency management. Congress requested that the recommendations be developed through the establishment of the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force and identified specific issues for Task Force focus in legislative requirements set forth in the congressional *Conference Report* accompanying Public Law 111-83, the *Homeland Security Act of 2010*. The legislative mandate states:¹

Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Task Force

The conferees recognize that since September 11, 2001, there has been a rush to increase, restructure, and reinvest in preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation policies and capabilities. This effort was reemphasized after Hurricane Katrina. Major preparedness and response policies have been developed or reshaped including: the National Preparedness Guidance; National Incident Management System; the National Response Framework; Comprehensive Planning Guidance; Disaster Housing Strategy; and Hazard Mitigation Assistance. Countless guidance documents have been issued to address specific issues or disasters. Additionally, over \$27,000,000,000 has been invested by the federal government in grants, and an untold amount at the local and State level. These investments have provided equipment to make our public infrastructure safer, our first responders better protected and prepared to respond to all hazards, and to ensure a more coordinated effort among the levels of government. Efforts to fully assess these investments and improved capabilities have not yet come to fruition although disparate attempts to find a more comprehensive measure through programs such as Cost-to-Capability, the Target Capabilities List, and the Comprehensive Assessment System are ongoing.

The conferees note that tremendous time and fiscal investments into preparedness have been made to date and believe it is time to take stock of such efforts to find ways to ensure the most efficient investments are made in the future. The reality of a constricted economy and competing interests make it imperative that current efforts related to homeland security and all-hazards response and recovery be streamlined. Therefore, the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), in cooperation with the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, shall lead the administrative effort of a Local, State, Tribal, and Federal preparedness task force. The task force is charged with making recommendations for all levels of government regarding: disaster and emergency guidance and policy; federal grants; and federal requirements, including measuring efforts. The task force shall especially evaluate: which policies and guidance need updating, and the most appropriate process by which to update them; which grant programs work the most efficiently and where programs can be improved; and the most appropriate way to collectively assess our capabilities and our capability gaps. Representation on the task force shall include: decision makers and practitioners from all disciplines including, but not limited to, firefighters, law enforcement, emergency management, health care, public works, development organizations, mitigation, and information technology; elected officials; and the private sector. NPD is directed to brief the Committees within 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act on its approach to establishing this task force and milestones for accomplishment.

¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Conference Report* (To Accompany H.R. 2892)...(H. Rpt. 111-298), Washington: Government Printing Office, 2009.

Task Force and Report Methodology

Task Force Composition

The Task Force is comprised of 36 members representing local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments recognized as leading homeland security and emergency management decision-makers and practitioners from a variety of disciplines. Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial members were selected based on merit from a pool of nominees referred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through a nationwide call. The Task Force also includes 25 *ex officio* members representing Federal departments and agencies. Federal *ex officio* members were selected based on the authorities and/or responsibilities of their office, as derived from their department or agency's designated lead role in the National Response Framework (NRF), and standing participation in the White House Domestic Resilience Group (DRG).

Report Organization

In structuring the work of the Task Force and the Report itself, we focused on four main areas—one cross-cutting, foundational area (Strategic Investments) along with the three explicit areas of emphasis in the congressional language:

1. **Strategic Investments:** A Task Force-defined area of emphasis focused on lowering the long-term cost of achieving desired preparedness outcomes by investing in fundamental initiatives that provide outstanding outcomes for minimal investment.
2. **Policy and Guidance:** Principles that establish and measure desired national preparedness outcomes, along with subordinate doctrine defining how to proceed, *i.e.*, the “ends.” We sought to examine not just the policies themselves, but the process by which they are developed and coordinated;
3. **Capabilities and Assessments:** The unit of measure (capabilities) for achieving desired preparedness outcomes by performing defined tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of performance, along with the process for measuring them (assessment), *i.e.*, the “ways.” We focused extensively on this area, which is the keystone of achieving effective, efficient policy outcomes; and
4. **Grant Administration:** The major national-level instrument for assisting non-Federal entities to develop preparedness capabilities that achieve desired policy outcomes, *i.e.*, “the means.” We sought to examine their effectiveness and the supporting administrative process.

We reviewed these areas of emphasis both in plenary Task Force meetings and in member-led working groups, conducting more than 30 weekly conference calls between four in-person Task Force meetings. In these sessions, we discussed issues, identified topics for further exploration, and deliberated on recommendation proposals. Over the past six months, we considered more than 375 draft recommendation proposals. In tandem, we developed a methodology for conveying the opinion of the Task Force and our recommendations to Congress in the Report.

We held meetings of the full Task Force membership, plus observers, in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. The meetings provided an opportunity for members to deliberate on issues and proposed recommendations in a collective setting. FEMA and DHS Intergovernmental Affairs dedicated staff to support the working group process, provide meeting arrangements, and consolidate member deliberations into a cohesive narrative to form the Report.

We adopted the final 25 recommendations contained in this Report by consensus as measured by members' submission of a signed acknowledgement. Members agreed that "consensus" would mean approval by all. If five or more members did not agree with a given recommendation, they would draft a statement of disagreement to include with the recommendation, indicating opposition and explaining the divergence in opinion.

National Dialogue on Preparedness

In addition to individual member recommendations, we felt it necessary to include the perspectives of non-governmental contributors. FEMA and DHS/IGA assisted the Task Force in establishing a National Dialogue on Preparedness, consisting of outreach meetings with private sector and non-governmental groups and an interactive, online website to allow the public to contribute. Through the Dialogue, members and staff were able to directly engage with more than 1,000 outside subject-matter experts, intergovernmental officials, and non-governmental stakeholders representing academia, think tanks, interest groups, professional organizations, all levels of government, and the private sector.

Throughout August and into September—National Preparedness Month—899 registered users submitted, reviewed, commented on, and voted on an additional 266 recommendations for our consideration. The process allowed members to see broad points of consensus on preparedness improvement areas, which greatly contributed to deliberation and prioritization of the final recommendation proposals. Additional information on the National Dialogue can be found in Appendix C.

Scope of the Task Force Report in Comparison to Related Initiatives

We relied heavily upon analysis of the numerous reports, studies, and strategies that preceded this initiative, along with the collective experience and wisdom of our members. While similar efforts preceded the Report, the Task Force believes that it is the first such body to reflect the shared responsibilities for preparedness that exist among all levels of government—local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal. In addition, we worked creatively to ensure that the opportunity for *meaningful* contribution was afforded to non-governmental entities—including the business community, volunteer and professional bodies, and the general public—in order to reflect the *entire* spectrum of responsibility for preparedness.

Our Report is not official policy or a proposed strategy. The recent *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)* and updated *National Security Strategy* each outline visions for homeland security that incorporate many of the same themes included in the Report. We recognize the need for implementation-level policy in our recommendations and were pleased that the White House National Security Staff provided an opportunity to comment on a limited number of provisions from the pending Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on national preparedness. Moreover, we look forward to opportunities to inform the PPD implementation process based on our recommendations to ensure that the national preparedness policy so vital to homeland security and emergency management in America is coordinated in a truly effective manner.



Mayor Richard M. Daley addresses members during a Task Force meeting in Chicago, Illinois (FEMA/Laurie Smith-Kuypers).

Historical Perspective: What Is Preparedness?

The old adages “be prepared” and “failing to prepare is preparing to fail” are familiar to us all. They represent a traditional recognition of the value of the *process* of preparation—or preparedness—to anticipate needs, prioritize them, plan and acquire the necessary resources for them, and ultimately be ready to meet a need when the time comes. Preparedness begets readiness. Those adages are also value-laden, enjoining preparedness based on an apparent necessity and a perceived cost of noncompliance, notably failure to achieve the need or goal. How effectively the process of preparedness is executed has performance implications.

The Scouting movement officially embraced the “be prepared” adage in 1907 and is now known to millions throughout the world. The Scouting movement was informed by military organizations, where appreciation of preparedness and the development of specific doctrine for it have deep historical roots and remain important aspects of individual basic training, organizational management, and strategic policy. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Coast Guard, another symbol of preparedness to many Americans, adopted the Latin phrase *semper paratus*—“Always Ready”—as its official motto. Many other military and emergency services organizations have adopted similar mottos, as well.

In both the Scouting and military worlds, preparedness is designed to be as much a mindset as any one specific effort, owing to the belief that the process of preparing to do something can be organized into a generalized, common framework of procedural steps applicable to a wide range of potential requirements or events. Learning the mindset and basic principles of preparedness thus enables an individual and, by extension, organizations and communities, to confront complex tasks using a common framework, even those for which previous experience cannot serve as a direct guide.

Ultimately, preparedness is not a destination or a condition at which to be arrived, but is more appropriately viewed as a continual process of refinement and adjustment. Plans are updated, exercises are conducted, emergencies occur, lessons learned are applied and the process continually evolves.

Evolution of Preparedness

The Task Force sees the fundamental, underlying principles of preparedness as being the bridge across all disciplines, contributors, and goals of homeland security and emergency management. But this was not always the case in the United States. Organizing that process for anything short of war was traditionally the exclusive responsibility of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial authorities, which primarily focused on their needs alone. Other than strictly national defense-related activities and limited recovery assistance provided by the Federal Government following catastrophic disasters, it was not until New Deal-era public works efforts, such as flood mitigation, and then World War II and the Cold War, that any national preparedness initiatives were undertaken as partnerships between local, State, Tribal, Territorial, or Federal levels of government. Even then, these partnerships were usually focused on specific threats such as nuclear fallout rather than being based on a comprehensive, national approach. The engine of preparedness remained principally at the community level.

The professional discipline of emergency management developed to meet that need by executing hazard mitigation, incident response, and disaster recovery efforts, along with the basic tenets of preparedness, mentioned above. In the context of traditional emergency management:

*Emergency preparedness encompasses actions undertaken before disaster impact that enable social units to respond actively when disaster does strike. Organizational preparedness activities include developing emergency response plans, training employees and response personnel on what to do in an emergency situation, acquiring needed equipment, supplies, and materials, and conducting drills and exercises.*²

Those fundamental activities were subsequently reflected in the “preparedness cycle” of planning, organizing, equipping, training, exercising, evaluation, and improvement activities necessary to enable response. Current national policies and plans, such as the National Response Framework, still reflect that response-centric view, but this perception is evolving. As the Nation’s resources and complexity of threats increased during the 20th century, the Federal Government took on a more direct role to address certain threats and hazards that no individual locality or State could be expected to handle on its own.

Over time, an “all hazards” approach to preparedness gained momentum. And, following the development of a more comprehensive homeland security and emergency management philosophy following 9/11, the preparedness emphasis on response evolved to reflect the full range of prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions. For example, the *QHSR* now states that achieving resiliency—one of the currently identified homeland security goals—“will require a significant change in U.S. emergency management from a primary focus on response and recovery to one that takes a wider view, balancing response and recovery with mitigation and preparedness.”³ While we agree that there ought to be a balance, we see preparedness as being essential to all missions.



*A family in a Long Island, New York shelter, circa 1955.*⁴

The distinction is relevant because, as part of Task Force deliberations, we devoted time to considering and understanding the concept of preparedness itself. We asked questions such as “what is preparedness?” to help scope our mission. But that exercise was quickly revealed to be a diversion. The basic tenets of preparedness, mentioned above in both philosophical and more technical terms, are relatively uncontroversial within both the emergency management discipline and homeland security policy. What has changed is the realization that preparedness can be only as effective as the goals and priorities for readiness. The challenge is determining what our readiness goals and priorities should be, from which preparedness activities are subsequently derived and then measured against. As the 9/11 Commission acknowledged, “Throughout the government, nothing has been harder for officials—executive or legislative—than to set priorities, making hard choices in allocating limited resources.”⁵

The real question then is “prepared for what?” This question is of fundamental relevance to the Task Force and all Americans. We must prioritize goals and have means to determine where we stand in terms of achieving them. Changes in national homeland security goals and priorities should be expected in the future, but the more institutionalized and standardized the common preparedness process becomes, the more easily it can be communicated, taught, executed, and evaluated on a comprehensive and cost-effective scale. Regardless of how those priorities evolve, a more institutionalized, common preparedness

² Kathleen J. Tierney, Michael K. Lindell, and Ronald W. Perry, *Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States* (Joseph Henry Press, 2001), 5.

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, February 2010, 31, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Task Force, *Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National Preparedness Efforts*, September 2006, 10, <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/DHS%20Civil%20Defense-HS%20-%20Short%20History.pdf> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, 395, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

process should continue to bring together the myriad disciplines, contributors, and goals that contribute to homeland security and emergency management.

Citizen Preparedness and the Perception of Responsibility

The 9/11 Commission noted that one of the major lessons from the 9/11 attacks was that “individual civilians need to take responsibility for maximizing the probability that they will survive, should disaster strike.”⁶ We believe that creating a “culture of preparedness” really begins with creating a culture of responsibility among the public, so that citizens feel compelled to prepare to help themselves before, during, or after a disaster to the greatest extent possible. This will not always be possible, but if more members of the public prepare effectively, response and recovery efforts can focus on the most vulnerable among us. This focus will increase response success, as well as reduce demand and ultimately conserve limited resources. The better prepared you are, the more ready and resilient you become—the faster you can bounce back from disaster.

Homeland security policy increasingly recognizes the critical role of individuals, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations in preparedness. We wholeheartedly agree with this assessment but recognize that the perceived efficacy and actual compliance with those proposed roles pose another challenge. Citizen preparedness and involvement in homeland security is not new. Past preparedness efforts acknowledged that individuals play a critical role. The U.S. Forest Service began the well-known “Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires” awareness campaign in 1944. Likewise, fire safety training has long been predicated on the simple maxim “Stop, Drop, and Roll.” Nuclear attack preparedness taught “Duck and Cover” to millions of school children and also focused on home-based efforts, such as building family fallout shelters. Related Ad Council campaigns focused on health and public safety issues outside the scope of civil defense, such as drunken driving, smoking, seatbelt use, and vaccination, to name a few.

Hazard-specific awareness campaigns remain for high-risk issues today, but the trend is toward applying the same all-hazards preparedness approach to individual preparedness. The *Ready.gov* campaign entreats citizens to maintain disaster kits, develop family emergency plans, and keep informed. This



“There Are 16 million Eyes In The City” poster from the “If You See Something, Say Something” public awareness campaign (Metropolitan Transit Authority).

approach reinforces fundamental preparedness principles, but achieving wide-spread participation remains a challenge. The public and private sectors must appreciate the risks they face in order to be expected to act. Government at all levels can increasingly control and make consistent the manner in which they communicate priorities to the public, private sector, and non-government organizations, which set appropriate expectations about what each can realistically contribute. Without clear expectations, these stakeholders may lack the imperative to act or the basis for appropriate decision-making.

In New York City, a history of terrorist plots and attacks helps to drive the imperative for citizen involvement. Public awareness to promote vigilance and prevention-minded suspicious activity reporting has proven effective. The attempted vehicle bombing of Times Square in May, 2010, was averted in part by the decision of local street

⁶ *Ibid*, 318.

vendors to notify authorities of suspicious activity. Subsequent interviews revealed that their sense of responsibility may have been emboldened by several factors: duty; appreciation of the risk of terrorism in the area; a strong relationship with local police; and a plan regarding what to do in the event of an incident.⁷ The New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority's "If You See Something, Say Something" public awareness campaign, which has been supported by the Transit Security Grant Program, was even quoted by one of the vendors when asked about his role.⁸

President Obama later stated that the attack "failed because ordinary citizens were vigilant and reported suspicious activities to authorities. It failed because these authorities—local, state and federal— acted quickly and did what they were trained to do."⁹ President Obama may have been referring to the authorities on the last point, but the citizens showed that they had a plan, too. They exemplified a culture of responsibility and preparedness that left them ready to act when the critical moment arrived.

The worst-case scenario occurs when expectations of government assistance are perceived by such stakeholders and then not delivered. On the contrary, the clear absence of government assistance serves as an incentive for "self-help" through individual, family, or business preparedness. Obviously, the ideal balance is a shared one, based on realistic expectations of roles and responsibilities. That balance is what makes preparedness measurement so important—authoritative progress drives new prioritization and/or refinements to existing priorities that may lead to cost efficiencies.

⁷ Corey Kilgannon and Michael S. Schmidt, "Vendors Who Alerted Police Called Heroes," *The New York Times*, May 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/nyregion/03vendor.html?_r=2 (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

⁸ Lisa Flam, "Hero Vendors Alerted NY Cops to Smoking SUV," *AOL News*, May 3, 2010, <http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/times-square-hero-vendors-alerted-cops-to-smoking-suv/19462393> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

⁹ The White House, "The President on Times Square: 'But as Americans, and as a Nation, We Will Not Be Terrorized,'" The White House Blog, May 4, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/04/president-times-square-americans-and-a-nation-we-will-not-be-terrorized> (accessed September 29, 2010).

Taking Stock: Preparedness Efforts Since 9/11

Ask emergency managers, first responders, elected officials, as well as members of the private sector and non-governmental organizations, and they will affirm that the United States is more prepared than ever before. But they will also acknowledge that their conclusion is limited to their jurisdiction. Citizens have a right to know, in a holistic way, if their communities, and the Nation, are prioritizing and addressing risks appropriately and in a timely and cost-effective way.

As the congressional language establishing the Task Force acknowledges, considerable time and investments have been made in the area of preparedness. The congressional language calls on the Task Force to “take stock” of these efforts. This chapter seeks to do just that, presenting a high-level review of preparedness activities since 9/11 in the overarching areas of preparedness policy and guidance, capabilities and assessments, and grant administration.

Given the breadth of preparedness initiatives at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal levels, we cannot possibly summarize all of the quantitative and qualitative preparedness-related data nationwide. Instead, we have opted to summarize in broad terms the Nation’s preparedness-related evolutions and accomplishments, seeking to bolster the intuition that we are more prepared with data and fact-based illustrations.

Preparedness Policy and Guidance

The Nation’s preparedness policy and guidance evolved from local, State, Tribal, and Territorial best practices and was re-shaped after the 9/11 attacks and again after Hurricane Katrina. While preparedness-related programs certainly existed at all levels of government prior to 9/11, these efforts were not unified by any common strategic vision, policy, or definition of preparedness.

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is just one example of a non-Federal effort that existed before the 9/11 attacks and grew substantially stronger afterward. EMAC is a state-initiated agreement to provide mutual aid with associated liability protections and reimbursement. After Hurricane Andrew devastated Florida in 1992, southern States developed a mutual aid agreement that was expanded nationally in 1995. In 2004, EMAC deployed more than 800 state and local personnel to the four, rapid-fire Florida hurricanes. The following year, EMAC increased operations to more than 20 times the 2004 levels, with all member States deploying personnel to the Katrina-ravaged Gulf region.¹⁰ EMAC continues to grow and evolve, and serves as an outstanding grass-roots model.

In the Federal domain, the 9/11 attacks led to dramatic organizational changes designed to unify policy-making for homeland security and emergency management. The first organizational changes were the creation of the White House Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), both established in October 2001. Together, these two organizations coordinated homeland security activities and related policy-making across the Federal Government in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. One of the first strategic-level activities undertaken by OHS was to develop and promulgate the Nation’s first *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, a document which identified “Emergency

¹⁰ Emergency Management Assistance Compact, “The History of Mutual Aid and EMAC,” <http://www.emacweb.org/?321> (accessed Sep. 20, 2010).

Preparedness and Response” as one of six critical homeland security mission areas.¹¹ As required by DHS’s grant guidance (see below), States and urban areas mirrored the national-level strategy development process by completing State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies which identified specific goals and objectives.

The *ad hoc* creation of the OHS soon became institutionalized as Congress passed the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* which formally established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a Cabinet-level department. The creation of DHS is frequently cited as one of the Nation’s largest reorganizations of the Federal Government—merging 22 Federal agencies into the third-largest Cabinet agency. In the preparedness domain, the newly created DHS included the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), a legacy Department of Justice (DOJ) agency that oversaw terrorism preparedness-related grant funding and associated preparedness policy. Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial jurisdictions likewise established their own departments/offices of homeland security. At the local level, this re-organization was frequently implemented simply by changing the name of the existing emergency management agency to indicate the assumption of homeland security duties. Some States, Tribes, and Territories mirrored this approach while others chose to create a separate homeland security agency or office.

In the year following the creation of DHS, the Federal Government began laying the groundwork for a more unifying preparedness policy framework. In December 2003, the White House issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness. HSPD-8 was developed as a companion to HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents. HSPD-8 called for the creation of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. It emphasized improvements to the delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments through grants, equipment, training, and exercises and proposed a capabilities-based planning approach to strengthen local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal preparedness.

Following HSPD-8’s publication, DHS and its Federal partners initiated development of a series of capabilities-based planning tools and associated policies that have continued to evolve through today. A series of illustrative National Planning Scenarios were developed to highlight the range of man-made and natural disasters and their potential impacts. DHS, working with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial partners, also developed a Universal Task List (UTL) and Target Capabilities List (TCL), outlining the tasks and associated capabilities needed to address the illustrative Planning Scenarios. These planning tools culminated in the first iteration of the National Preparedness Goal which DHS released in draft form in December 2005. The initial National Preparedness Goal acknowledged the imperative to “achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability” and identified a series of seven National Priorities for particular focus in the preparedness domain.¹² Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments began integrating these capability-based tools into a range of planning, training, and exercise activities.

While preparedness policy and guidance was evolving so, too, was the DHS organizational structure, including its preparedness components. In 2004, DHS’s ODP was merged with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to create the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP), overseeing preparedness policy and implementation for local, State, Tribal,

¹¹ The White House Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 2002, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf (accessed Sep. 30, 2010). The other five mission areas specified were: 1) Intelligence and Warning; 2) Border and Transportation Security; 3) Domestic Counterterrorism; 4) Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets; and 5) Defending against Catastrophic Threats

¹² U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidelines*, 2007, <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/npg.pdf> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010). The seven national priorities identified were: 1) Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response Plan; 2) Expand Regional Collaboration; 3) Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; 4) Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities; 5) Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities; 6) Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities; and 7) Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

Territorial, and Federal stakeholders. In 2005, DHS underwent a significant internal re-organization, creating a new Preparedness Directorate that consolidated most preparedness-related agencies under one organizational entity, distinct from the Department's response coordination capabilities at FEMA.

As DHS was moving forward with its internal re-organization, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, resulting in the costliest disaster in U.S. history.¹³ Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath served as the impetus for fundamental organizational and policy evolutions at the Federal level. In order to solidify the nation's all-hazards preparedness policy and effectively coordinate the Federal Government's preparedness and response capabilities, the *Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA)* transferred nearly all offices within the Preparedness Directorate into FEMA and made the FEMA Administrator responsible for leading the Federal Government's comprehensive emergency management system. *PKEMRA* established a new FEMA deputy administrator position to oversee the preparedness portfolio. *PKEMRA* also called on FEMA to establish an all-hazards "National Preparedness System," re-emphasizing the importance of capabilities-based policy and guidance and a more unified implementation nationwide. Nine months after *PKEMRA*, the *Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007* was passed, making minor adjustments to *PKEMRA* and amending the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* to further define and specify how homeland security grants are administered by FEMA to support preparedness goals.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, DHS and FEMA made a series of updates and revisions to policy and guidance, including several required by *PKEMRA*. DHS updated the National Response Plan, which became the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF integrates key lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and seeks to better define the roles and responsibilities of all contributors—local, State, Tribal, Territorial, Federal, non-governmental, and private sector. As required by *PKEMRA*, DHS also issued the National Preparedness Guidelines along with an updated Target Capabilities List (TCL 2.0). These policy and guidance documents built on previous iterations of DHS's capabilities-based planning tools but also reflected key post-Katrina changes—notably the addition of an eighth national priority focused on planning and community preparedness.

During this time, FEMA also undertook an extensive revision to its *State and Local Guide 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning* which had last been updated in 1996. The result was *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101): Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans*, which summarized FEMA's recommendations to all levels of government on how to address the entire planning process. Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial planners began the process of integrating *CPG 101* guidance into their respective plans.

Concerns about a global influenza pandemic also resulted in major preparedness-related policy and guidance developments. In 2005, the White House released its *National Strategy To Safeguard Against The Danger Of Pandemic Influenza*. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) followed this national-level strategy with its *HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan*, designed to provide pandemic planning guidance to health departments at all levels of government. Similarly, most States and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) jurisdictions added to or updated their pandemic influenza plans.

More recently, DHS has been working to further evolve preparedness policy and guidance, continuing updates and refinements to the Target Capabilities List and issuing a draft *National Disaster Recovery Framework* to provide detailed guidance on the recovery portion of the homeland security and emergency management mission spectrum. The preparedness policy-making structure has also continued to evolve. For example, the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council have merged into a unified

¹³ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, 2006, 5, <http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

National Security Staff in recognition of the increasingly inter-related nature of national security and homeland security.

Success Story: Preparedness Planning

Hurricane Katrina laid bare a host of planning-related deficiencies at the Federal, State, and local levels. In 2005, both the President and Congress called on DHS to conduct a comprehensive review of the state of planning in an effort to identify and address areas for improvement. DHS responded by executing a two-phase “Nationwide Plan Review” asking States and selected urban areas to conduct a planning self-assessment which was then followed by an independent assessment.

The findings, as documented in the Nationwide Plan Review Phase I and Phase II Reports, revealed the scale of the challenge. The review found that the majority of emergency operations plans and planning processes were not fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage a catastrophic event. The review also found significant shortcomings in planning for non-catastrophic disasters.

In light of these findings, DHS initiated several steps to strengthen planning at all levels of government. At the national level, the National Response Plan was revised into the National Response Framework with expanded Emergency Support Function, Support, and Incident Annexes along with Partner Guides.

DHS emphasized planning in subsequent grant guidance and established several planning-specific grant programs, such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program, to further focus efforts at the State, local, Tribal, and Territorial levels. As noted above, FEMA also worked with non-Federal stakeholders to issue *CPG 101*, which articulated a recommended common approach to planning for Federal, State, local, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders.

The net effects of this renewed focus on planning emerged as DHS conducted an update to the Nationwide Plan Review in 2010. The updated review found significant improvements to plans and planning processes. Nearly all States and urban areas indicated that their basic emergency operations plans fully or partially incorporated elements of *CPG 101*. While acknowledging continued areas of improvement, the 2010 review also showed dramatic improvement in the confidence levels of States and urban areas in their basic emergency operations plans’ ability to manage a catastrophic event.

Capabilities and Assessments

The process of developing capabilities and conducting assessments has proved to be one of the most challenging endeavors faced by the homeland security and emergency management community. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, assessment standards were simply not urgent priorities. Instead, rapidly establishing homeland security policy and getting grant funds out to first responders around the country became the initial focus areas for homeland security and emergency management stakeholders. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the primary preparedness assessment metrics focused on grant dollars awarded and spent by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders.

As preparedness policy evolved and expanded, so too did DHS’s efforts to track and assess improvements. As a starting point, State and UASI grantees were required to develop strategies that articulated specific homeland security and preparedness goals and objectives. Beginning in 2004, DHS required grantees to submit Biannual Strategy Implementation Reports (BSIRs) which provided details on how grantees were spending grant money. The BSIRs required grantees to map their grant dollars and projects against the goals and objectives in their strategy documents. The BSIRs also captured a range of additional data regarding the “solution area” supported (planning, organizing, equipping, training, or exercising) as well as output metrics, such as the number of personnel trained or number of exercises conducted.

With the release of the National Preparedness Goal, Target Capabilities List, and the associated National Priorities, DHS began integrating these capability-based planning tools into its assessment framework. As a starting point, States and UASI jurisdictions were required in 2005 to align their homeland security strategies with the National Priorities. Beginning with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 grant guidance, applicants were required to submit grant investment justifications that described how particular grant investments would contribute to capability development. The table below summarizes just a handful of the data points collected by DHS that identify how efforts at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal levels are contributing to improved preparedness nationwide.

National Priority	Representative Accomplishments to Date
Expand Regional Collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beginning in FY2009, FEMA instituted a Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program focused on supporting coordination of regional all-hazard planning for catastrophic events, including the development of integrated planning communities, plans, protocols and procedures to manage a catastrophic event. FEMA has continued the process of empowering its regional offices, supporting preparedness-related training, exercises, and outreach activities tailored to the needs of each region.
Implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Over 85% of States assessed themselves as fully compliant with NIMS standards based on data collected through NIMSCAST. More than 75% of States and more than 80% of urban areas report confidence that their overall basic emergency operations plans are well-suited to meet the challenges presented during a large-scale or catastrophic event.
Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NIPP implementation accomplishments include completion of specific plans for each of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors, and implementation of chemical security regulations. For FY2008 Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) grants, 93% of plans have received final approval.
Strengthen Information-Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are 72 designated State and major urban area fusion centers across the 50 States and the District of Columbia. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) has brought together Federal, State, and local partner organizations to test and evaluate policies, procedures, and technology needed to implement a unified process that fosters a broader sharing of SARs that are reasonably indicative of potential intelligence gathering or pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.
Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From FY2004 through FY2009, over \$4.8 billion in homeland security grant funds have been used by States and urban areas to support interoperable communications. Through exercised Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICP), by the end of FY2007, 75 urban and metropolitan areas had effectively established regional interoperability. Through SAFECOM, DHS has provided interoperability guidance, tools, and templates to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial emergency response agencies.
Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From FY2004 through FY2009, States and urban areas have allocated nearly \$3.1 billion of homeland security grant funds to improve their CBRNE capabilities. DHS has provided nuclear detection and radiological training to 30,176 law enforcement officials through more than 37,600 course completions.

Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HHS grant and cooperative agreement funding has supported State initiatives to: develop and exercise pandemic response plans; improve surge capacity and enhance community and hospital preparedness for public health emergencies; and build healthcare partnerships to improve hospital and emergency department surge capacity. • HHS has invested heavily in medical countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), including vaccines for smallpox and anthrax as well as antiviral courses for pandemic influenza.
Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • States and urban areas have allocated nearly \$3.9 billion of homeland security grant funds towards the priority of strengthening planning and community preparedness over the FY2004-FY2009 period. • The Federal Government has further supported community preparedness through the creation of Citizen Corps and the Ready Campaign. Nationwide reports indicate that 80% of the U.S. population is covered by the 2,445 local and Tribal Citizen Corps Councils currently in operation.

PKEMRA required DHS to further evolve the assessment-related data collected from grantees. Notably, it required annual State Preparedness Reports. These reports require States to identify accomplishments, current capabilities, targets, initiatives, and resources aligned to the national priorities. DHS also began a “cost-to-capability” initiative to help quantify the impact of grant dollars on preparedness efforts. In addition, DHS has been working to establish the *PKEMRA*-mandated Comprehensive Assessment System.

While DHS has requested and collected a vast amount of data from its stakeholders, the key data points have tended to focus on outputs rather than outcomes. FEMA has proactively examined this issue through a Reporting Requirements Working Group, tasked with both examining assessment and reporting data from local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders while recommending ways to achieve more meaningful assessment results. Despite these challenges, it is clear that local jurisdictions are making progress. The success story below from Southern California is just one illustration of how jurisdictions have demonstrably improved preparedness using a combination of resources.

Success Story: Grant Funding and Capability Improvements in Southern California

Two significant wildfire events occurred in southern California since the dramatic increases in Federal grant funding following 9/11. The multi-fire incidents, occurring in 2003 and 2007 in roughly the same geographic area, offer an opportunity to compare preparedness and mission performance vis-à-vis grant funding.

The 2003 Cedar Creek fire consumed more than 280,000 acres of land, destroyed more than 2,800 buildings or homes, and resulted in 15 deaths. The 2007 fires resulted in the largest evacuation in California history—more than 1 million people in total, greater even than Hurricane Katrina. At the height of the firestorm in late October 2007, seven separate fires burned in San Diego County, California. The community was, quite literally, burning in every direction. The flames consumed nearly 369,000 acres or about 13% of the total County land. Ten lives were claimed in the fires.

And while the impacts in both 2003 and 2007 were significant, a key fact emerged: Federal homeland security and emergency management grant funding, combined with local investments, had significantly improved the region’s preparedness.

Grant-Supported Activity	Approximate Funding Amount/ Source	Improvement from 2003 to 2007
Brush and Vegetation Management and Fire-Safe Community Design Concepts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$47M/Federal • \$5M/local 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced hazardous fuels including nearly 500,000 dead, dying, and diseased trees • Required wildland fire and fire protection review of all discretionary land use applications
Firefighting Equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$6.6M/mostly local 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanded firefighting arsenal with the purchase of two firefighting helicopters • Purchased 20 new firefighting vehicles, including water tenders, engines, and rescue rigs
Emergency Operations Center Upgrade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$865,000/Federal (one-time) • \$400,000/Federal (annually) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updated state-of-the-art communication and coordination for the region's response to the 2007 wildfires • Supported staffing of 50% of EOC personnel—including Operations Chief, Logistics Chief, and Information/ Intelligence Chief
Purchase and Maintenance of WebEOC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$90,000/Federal (one-time) • \$100,000/Federal (annually) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established critical communication network during the 2007 fires, connecting over 250 agencies with up-to-date information and situational awareness • Funded the GIS mapping unit, which produced critical maps for both first responders and the public during the fires
Public Awareness Campaigns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$700,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mailed a Family Disaster Plan to all 1.4 million households in the County, providing residents with step-by-step instructions to protect their homes and families • Launched an extensive disaster preparedness public education campaign that included television, radio, and billboard announcements
Communication Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$4.5M/Federal • \$20M/local 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significantly upgraded unreliable communications system following 2003 wildfires • Supported communication among personnel from 264 different agencies during 2007 wildfires
Public Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$200,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established a partnership with 2-1-1 to provide health, human service, and disaster information to callers • 2-1-1 operators answered nearly 109,000 calls during the first week of the 2007 fires—calls that otherwise would have clogged 911 call centers • Established a Joint Information Center system and trained public information officers throughout the County in crisis communications and JIC operations • JIC system supported more than 200 media releases during 2007 wildfires
Mass Notification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$430,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchased two mass notification systems—AlertSanDiego and Reverse 911—both of which were used during the 2007 wildfires • Disseminated evacuation notices to an estimated 515,000 County residents via mass notification systems
Evacuation Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$100,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed the region's first Evacuation Plan that identified transportation routes and capacities and addressed the sheltering of people and pets

Sheltering Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$50,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained nearly 200 County employees as shelter workers/shelter managers • Deployed shelter workers/managers to County-operated shelter locations during the 2007 wildfires • Preplanning efforts allowed for Red Cross, County, City, and community agencies to shelter nearly 20,000 people and 2,500 horses and large animals
Exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$300,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since 2005, conducted a full-scale disaster exercise every 18 months along with smaller tabletop and function exercises—exercises that helped the region prepare for the 2007 wildfires
Recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$100,000/Federal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adopted a regional recovery plan which provided a regional blueprint for recovery phase of the 2007 fires • Recovery efforts assisted over 24,000 fire victims in the months following the fires

Ultimately, the San Diego region was able to successfully endure the 2007 wildfires. The County had established necessary preparedness measures, and all levels of government—as well as the community itself—supported a coordinated and cooperative response. A key component of this preparedness was the effective use of Federal preparedness grant funds to supplement local and state funding and resources.

Grant Administration

As discussed, the primary means for the Federal Government to promote and enhance national preparedness has been to provide funding to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial entities. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, DOJ's Office for Domestic Preparedness administered a pool of preparedness grants that were focused largely on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) preparedness and totaled less than \$100 million.¹⁴ Other Federal agencies, such as FEMA and HHS also administered preparedness-related grants that pre-dated the 9/11 attacks.¹⁵

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Federal preparedness-related assistance to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments increased dramatically. Through a FY2002 supplemental appropriations act (Public Law 107-206), Congress appropriated funding to a number of Federal agencies to support the 9/11 recovery efforts, as well as to assist local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to prepare for and respond to future acts of terrorism. The bill provided \$151 million to DOJ for grants and cooperative agreements to focus primarily on first responder training and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism. The bill also provided more than \$400 million to FEMA for emergency management planning and assistance. In addition, through the Department of Education's Project School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV) grant program, almost \$14 million was provided to State and local educational agencies to assist in mental health recovery efforts following 9/11.

The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Public Law 107-296), charged DHS's ODP with "directing and supervising terrorism preparedness grant programs of the Federal Government (other than those programs administered by HHS) for all emergency response providers." In its first fiscal year (FY2003), DHS's grant awards totaled over \$4 billion—the vast majority of it directed to State and urban area preparedness

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, *Strategic Goal One: Protect America Against the Threat of Terrorism*, <http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/pr2001/Section01.htm> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service, Ben Canada, *Terrorism Preparedness: A Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs*, 2001, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7931.pdf> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

initiatives. DHS's initial preparedness-related grant funding fell into several main categories. Several grant programs allocated funds to States using a population-driven formula. A second set of grant programs integrated risk-based and other related criteria to allocate grant funds among particular grantees. The third set of grants included programs that competitively awarded funds directly to grant applicants.

As homeland security and emergency management policy evolved, so did DHS's grant programs. Each year's programs reflected the evolving concerns of both Congress and DHS itself. Fiscal Year 2003 saw specific grant funding allocated for emergency operations centers while FY2005 saw the establishment of a Transit Security Grant Program. And while DHS grant guidance acknowledged the importance of all-hazards planning, the emphasis of its grants programs, right up until Hurricane Katrina, was largely on terrorism preparedness.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, DHS's grant programs experienced several important changes. *PKEMRA* offered no specific changes to DHS's grant programs but added an emphasis on "natural disasters." After *PKEMRA*, the 9/11 Act mandated changes to existing grant programs, focusing on the administration of DHS grant funds, the responsibilities of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial Governments, and the allowable use of grant funds. These changes included new requirements for grantees applying for Homeland Security Grant Program funds but, more importantly, required expanded use of risk information in grant allocations. Additionally, Congress included specific language around its intent for DHS to focus on an all-hazards approach.

DHS's FY2006 grant guidance—the first grant guidance issued after Hurricane Katrina—re-emphasized the importance of all-hazards preparedness and, for the first time, integrated the all-hazards national preparedness priorities as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal. In addition, DHS began integrating risk into allocation formulas for its State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP). Subsequent years have seen an expansion of more targeted grants, including programs designated specifically for Tribal stakeholders, urban area non-profit stakeholders, for regional catastrophic planning, and for public safety interoperable communications.

While DHS administers the vast majority of preparedness-related grants, other Federal agencies—notably HHS—have rapidly expanded preparedness grants, particularly in the area of pandemic preparedness. Beginning in FY2005, HHS began allocating significant resources to bioterrorism and general hospital preparedness. By FY2007, HHS was administering over \$1 billion in preparedness grants, or about 11% of the total preparedness-related grant outlays.¹⁶ DHS still administers the vast majority of preparedness-related grants—over FY2007 and FY2008 (the last years with complete information) DHS administered 85% of the more than \$20 billion in Federal preparedness grant funding as defined in the *Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs (IRPG)*.


Since 2003, the U.S. Department of Education, through its Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) grant program, has funded 820 grants to local education agencies (LEAs) totaling over \$230 million. The REMS discretionary grant program is the primary program administered by the Department's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS). The program supports infrastructure protection for K-12 schools and provides funding to LEAs to create, strengthen, or improve emergency management plans at the district and school building levels through training for school personnel and coordination with local community partners. Grantees must also agree to develop plans that:

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Grant Programs Directorate, *Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs: Report to Congress*, 2009.

- Consider the communication, transportation, and medical needs of students and staff with disabilities;
- Support NIMS implementation; and
- Include plans for:
 - Communicating emergency policies to parents and guardians;
 - Improving LEA capacity to sustain the emergency management process; and
 - Prepare the LEA for an infectious disease outbreak, such as pandemic influenza.

Additional REMS grant requirements include coordinating with the State or local homeland security plan and developing a written food defense plan that is designed to safeguard the school district's food supply.

The chart below illustrates the growth in preparedness grant programs (as defined in the *IRPG*) since 1991. The *IRPG* identified Federal assistance programs that funded prevention, protection, and response missions for all hazards, and that were consistent with the mission areas defined in national policy and doctrine, specifically HSPD-8. Funding data for the chart is derived from aggregate financial information contained in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA), Fiscal Years 1991 to 2009.¹⁷



¹⁷ Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, "About CFDA," <https://www.cfda.gov/> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Federal Grants in Perspective

While Federal grants represent significant fiscal outlays—DHS alone awarded over \$27 billion in grants between fiscal years 2003 and 2009—we noted that Federal grant outlays represent a relatively small share of the overall preparedness-related spending by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments.

The table below summarizes data on Federal preparedness grants and State and local preparedness expenditures. The Federal preparedness grant data is from FEMA's *Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs* and includes all grant outlays—not just those from DHS—assessed to be preparedness-related. The state and local preparedness expenditure data comes from the Census Bureau's annual survey on State & Local Government Finance Data and includes expenditures categorized as public safety, hospital, and health-related. The table uses FY2007 and FY2008 information as this is the most recent available dataset.

While we recognize that this is not a perfect comparison, the data demonstrate the order of magnitude difference between Federal preparedness grant outlays and comparable State and local expenditures. While Federal preparedness grant outlays are a comparatively small part of State and local preparedness expenditures, we emphasize that Federal grants have served a critical role in building and sustaining capabilities nationwide. Every member of the Task Force agreed that these grant funds enabled their jurisdiction to make capability investments that would not have been made without the availability of Federal assistance.

	FY2007	FY2008
Total Federal Preparedness-Related Grant Outlays	\$10,526,829,010	\$9,769,354,577
Total State and Local Hospital, Public Health, and Public Safety Expenditures	\$407,162,947,000	\$438,357,811,000
Grant Outlays as % of State and Local Expenditures	2.59%	2.23%

These figures not only articulate the importance of targeted Federal investment to develop and sustain capability and capacity. They reflect the wisdom of incorporating substantial local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives into developing and implementing Federal programs.

Conclusions

These accomplishments at all levels of government—from Federal policy and guidance to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial capabilities, achieved with assistance through Federal grants—represent substantial improvements since 9/11. We have made tremendous strides toward achieving national priorities and meeting jurisdiction-specific goals, yet we continue to believe that we can improve. As we take stock of how far we have come, we believe that the key to future success is a culture of collaboration. While, in many cases, we have worked to ensure that our own jurisdictions can aptly prevent, protect, respond, and recover from emergencies, we believe that we can gain efficiencies and strengthen capabilities by working together, as a Nation, to better prepare for all hazards.



Members of the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force deliberate in a meeting held at the Chicago Cultural Center, Chicago, Illinois (FEMA/Laurie Smith-Kuypers).

Recommendations to Improve National Preparedness

Based on the Task Force’s examination of national preparedness efforts since September 11, 2001, we offer the following recommendations for congressional consideration. We chose to organize the recommendations according to the legislative requirement, with the addition of cross-cutting, efficiency-generating initiatives found in the Strategic Investments section. Accordingly, our recommendations are organized into the following sections:

- Strategic Investments;
- Policy and Guidance;
- Capabilities and Assessments; and
- Grant Administration.

For each of these sections, the Report identifies the overarching challenge(s), summarizes Task Force discussions, and presents associated recommendations.

Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness

Challenge

Preparedness requirements are increasingly numerous and complex, challenging the Nation’s ability to sustain and grow preparedness capabilities efficiently.

While most of the Task Force recommendations focus on efficiency- and collaboration-enabling refinements to the “as is” preparedness system that has evolved since 9/11, there are a number of areas that comprise the “to be” system which could effectively lower the long-term cost of desired preparedness goals by investing early in *cost-reducing* measures. We made a point throughout our deliberations to consider bold, innovative ideas that would address concerns in Congress about the long-term cost-effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness investments. Such approaches could have dramatic implications for the future of preparedness.

The Task Force believes that the key to significantly reducing system costs is to seek structural ways to affect broad and lasting benefits. We sought means to reduce the burden on the preparedness system by using existing structures to build preparedness capability, and to enhance preparedness efforts that make response and recovery more efficient and cost-effective. Five primary focus areas emerged through our deliberations:

- Improve the ability to strategically forecast emerging preparedness requirements and associated policies and/or capabilities;
- Develop and promote preparedness-related educational materials that school districts can integrate into existing curricula;
- Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to become trained and materially prepared for emergencies;

- Promote advanced recovery planning, which can speed successful disaster recovery and improve resilience; and
- Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness implications.

Overarching Recommendation

Consider bold, innovative investments to increase the long-term cost-effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness through cost-reducing measures.

Recommendation: Include preparedness in the portfolio of strategic, futures-oriented analysis currently conducted by the National Intelligence Council.

We recognize the importance of a national strategic threat and hazard assessment to authoritatively inform preparedness priorities based on risk and recommend that this process integrate “futures analysis”-type assessments from the National Intelligence Council. The recent *QHSR* identified the need to “pursue a rigorous scientific understanding of current and future threats”¹⁸ and includes forward-looking considerations in the short-term.

However, the complexity of the envisioned homeland security and emergency management enterprise, especially in terms of non-governmental roles, means that desired preparedness outcomes often may take years to achieve. That reality necessitates that emerging requirements be anticipated and considered early and across the entire preparedness domain. As the homeland security and emergency management system continues to mature, a range of dynamic issues—such as the environment, demographics, economics, and health trends—are likely to play increasingly important roles in both the medium- and long-term. These issues must be better understood to ensure that preparedness policies are anticipatory, not reactionary. Applying forward-looking analyses in the preparedness system should encourage entrepreneurial approaches to emerging problems and enable testing of promising ideas.

Accordingly, DHS should work with the National Intelligence Council to integrate such preparedness-focused futures analyses into its activities. DHS should also identify ways to prioritize preparedness futures analyses in academia. DHS should ensure that the results of these analyses inform near-term strategic planning and review efforts, such as the *QHSR*.

Desired Outcomes:

- The National Intelligence Council integrates preparedness-related futures analyses into its activities; and
- DHS is able to use futures analyses to make authoritative judgments about future requirements and/or capabilities, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, 2010, 74, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Recommendation: The Department of Education, working with FEMA, should develop materials that school districts can use to implement a preparedness curriculum.

The need for a “culture of preparedness” has been described frequently since 9/11 and is now part of the preparedness lexicon. We discussed this issue at length and identified several structural challenges to the outcomes associated with a culture of preparedness. Ultimately, inconsistency and lack of imperative conspire to inhibit the *scale* of participation needed to achieve critical mass—the “culture of preparedness.”

While school-based preparedness initiatives exist, such as Teen Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the DHS-sponsored Student Tools for Emergency Planning (STEP) curriculum, they do not meaningfully affect the key outcomes necessary for a culture of preparedness—scale, consistency, and commonality. While *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* advanced similar, comprehensive recommendations, along with curriculum recommendations for hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes, a comprehensive approach has yet to materialize.

Developing preparedness materials to integrate into educational curricula is one important way to address this challenge of scale. While we recognize that education of our Nation’s students is primarily a State and local matter, we also recognize the importance of ensuring that our students are prepared for a variety of disasters. Developing curricular materials would balance these two tensions—providing a framework of materials which individual school districts and teachers could integrate flexibly. Teen CERT, STEP, the American Red Cross’s “Masters of Disasters” curriculum, and the California Emergency Management Agency’s (CalEMA) partnership with the National Guard for school-based preparedness education should serve as valuable templates for curricular materials for various age groups.

Broadly considered, the Nation invests heavily in education because of a core belief in enabling future generations to fully participate in the American dream. We believe that a well-educated citizen should understand the tenets of basic preparedness. By entrusting our Nation’s teachers to incorporate preparedness concepts into existing curricula, we can dramatically increase citizen preparedness in one generation and achieve a significant return on a modest preparedness investment.

Desired Outcomes:

- School districts around the country integrate preparedness principles and materials into curricula; and
- Citizens entering adulthood understand the culture of preparedness and have taken basic steps to better prepare themselves individually or as a family at home, in the community, and in the workplace.

Recommendation: Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies.

The *QHSR* argues that citizens must be informed; trained; materially and psychologically prepared to withstand disruption; and know their role in a crisis. Since 2003, DHS Citizen Corps national household surveys suggest modest improvements in individual and community preparedness across each of these dimensions.¹⁹ Yet, key preparedness metrics remain discouraging. Fewer than half of all citizens are familiar with community preparedness plans and resources. Less than 40% of citizens have participated

¹⁹ 2003 *Citizen Corps Survey of U.S. Households: Final Survey Report*, Office of Citizen Corps, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003.
2007 *Citizen Corps Survey of U.S. Households: Final Survey Report*, Office of Community Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007.
2009 *Citizen Corps Survey of U.S. Households: Final Survey Report*, Office of Community Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009.

in preparedness skills training. Although 57% report being materially prepared for a crisis at home, far fewer retain emergency supplies at the workplace or in the car. Similarly, less than 50% of citizens have established a household emergency plan. Finally, although nearly 60% of citizens “know their role” in a natural disaster, only 20% are confident in their ability to react to an act of terrorism. While we must undoubtedly improve our existing preparedness efforts, we must also consider other creative ways to move individuals from ambivalence to action.

One promising new preparedness initiative involves incentivizing individuals to take action by providing tax breaks for preparedness investments. We therefore recommend that all levels of government consider establishing financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to undertake preparedness activities. The underlying logic is simple: prepared citizens minimize the potential costs of disaster and reduce the strain on first responders during a major event. The science is similarly encouraging: behavioral economists widely recognize that minor financial incentives can succeed in motivating individuals to make life-affirming decisions where even the risks of abstract, severe consequences cannot.

Moderate investments of time, energy, and resources to address potential problems before they occur can achieve significant savings in the long run. More importantly, incentives create an artificial imperative in the absence of perceived threats or hazards. Incentive-based approaches may be valuable in regions prone to less frequent, but potentially catastrophic incidents. Compliance with mitigation efforts such as structural reinforcements in hurricane or earthquake zones, or defensible space in the case of wildfires, should produce tangible rewards in terms of property value, tax breaks, or insurance rebates. In fact, some States—including Virginia and Louisiana—are already complementing their existing preparedness programming with tax incentives to encourage citizens to act.

Desired Outcomes:

- Governments at all levels increasingly consider and implement innovative financial incentives to promote preparedness; and
- Increasing numbers of individuals and businesses engage in preparedness planning and activities.

Recommendation: Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and magnitude of disaster recovery.

Resiliency to catastrophic events is predicated on rapid return to normalcy. Mitigation and prevention are designed to reduce or eliminate the consequences of the event—that is, to reduce the degree of recovery that is necessary. By contrast, advanced recovery efforts are designed to make recovery activities more efficient, rapid, and effective.²⁰

In addition to formulating plans, jurisdictions should take a number of concrete steps to speed recovery for likely events, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, or similar unplanned events. These steps include establishing public-private partnerships, screening and evaluating bids for anticipated contract-based services, and developing legislation to give the jurisdiction specific authorities in a disaster. In this context, National Dialogue contributors noted that the private sector, faith-based and community initiative organizations, voluntary organizations, and individuals have significant capabilities and resources that they are willing and able to bring to bear rapidly during a disaster. These resources and capabilities may

²⁰ Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard and Arnold M. Howitt, “Acting in Time Against Disaster: A Comprehensive Risk Management Framework,” to appear in *Learning from Catastrophes: Strategies for Reaction and Response*, ed. Howard Kunreuther and Michael Useem. (Wharton School Publishing, 2010).

be slowed or even rendered unavailable because the requisite relationships and agreements were not established in advance.

Governments at all levels should take the lead to establish these partnerships and remove barriers by amending financial regulations and conducting cross-governmental coordination. A best practice commonly identified to support and expedite these partnerships includes offering private sector and voluntary organization leaders seats at the emergency operations center.

Success Story: San Francisco's Advanced Recovery Initiative

The City and County of San Francisco have partnered with Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government to undertake an initiative known as the "Citywide Post-Disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative" ("Recovery Initiative"). The goal is to build the city's capabilities to restore lifelines and facilitate economic and community recovery following a major incident.²¹

The Recovery Initiative is coordinated by the General Services Agency (GSA), the Department of Emergency Management (DEM), and Office of the Controller in collaboration with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

Current Recovery Initiative projects include convening the first known local Lifeline Council of major utilities to explore interdependencies and restoration strategies, a post-disaster governance project, a financial planning strategy, an enterprise risk management program, a community resilience initiative, economic impact analysis, a long-term housing plan, and coordination with regional and Federal recovery efforts.²²

Desired Outcomes:

- Jurisdictions take steps—such as those identified in the San Francisco Success Story—to initiate advanced recovery planning efforts; and
- Jurisdictions are able to recover from catastrophic events more efficiently, rapidly, and effectively.

Recommendation: Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness implications.

President Obama ordered a "clean slate" review of cyberspace policy that resulted in the 2009 White House *Cyberspace Policy Review*. The review states that the "globally interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure known as 'cyberspace' underpins almost every facet of modern society and provides critical support for the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national security." The Task Force recognizes the complexity of emerging cyberspace policy and applauds the review's proposal for a revised national cybersecurity strategy. We anticipate that the revised strategy will incorporate the same imperative for enterprise-wide collaboration seen in our Report, the *National Security Strategy*, *QHSR*, and the *Cyberspace Policy Review* itself.

Federal efforts to assist local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to better understand, prioritize, and address cybersecurity implications are critical. The Task Force believes that cybersecurity-related preparedness outside the Federal purview lags behind other preparedness efforts emphasized since 9/11. Many of the beneficial homeland security and emergency management capabilities developed are deeply

²¹ Heidi Sieck, "Presentation from the City and County of San Francisco to the Task Force," Presentation, Task Force Meeting, San Francisco, CA, July 27, 2010.

²² General Services Agency of the City and County of San Francisco, "Citywide Post-Disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative," <http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=4596> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

dependent on data-driven, cyberspace-based systems, from public messaging, emergency dispatch, incident management, intelligence and information sharing, and even planning and recovery efforts such as disaster assistance. Imagine if those capabilities were compromised, regardless of whether from malicious attack or physical damage from a natural disaster. How would the losses affect or exacerbate ongoing response or recovery? The complexity of that dependency will only increase and, we fear, be exposed with significant costs unless the preparedness implications of cybersecurity are prioritized now.

To that end, we seek to ensure that America's revised cybersecurity policy takes into account the full range of preparedness considerations affected by cyberspace. The *Cyberspace Policy Review* emphasizes the threat of "cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusions and operations." We concur that those threats are grave and could affect emergency management activities: cybercrime is already estimated to cost the global economy in excess of \$1 trillion annually and hackers have compromised government systems overseas and defaced official websites relied upon by the public for authoritative, timely information.²³

But the *Cyberspace Policy Review's* only reference to cybersecurity in the context of natural disasters is in terms of the reliability and continuity of high-level emergency communication systems, which have specific connotation to Federal-level continuity of government capabilities. Those systems are essential to national security, but most disasters are local and have more emergency response and recovery requirements than just continuity of government.

The forthcoming strategy would benefit from including considerations specific to ensuring the resiliency of existing preparedness efforts at the local, State, Tribal, and Territorial levels *in addition to* addressing cyber attacks. On-scene emergency services and regional- or national-level incident management rely heavily upon cyberspace to facilitate communication and information sharing during response and recovery efforts. While loss of system continuity due to malicious attack poses policy challenges and could exacerbate the effects of a natural disaster, loss or compromise of cyberspace due to natural disasters may have the same effect in practice. Achieving cybersecurity should include the goal of cyber resiliency *regardless* of cause. An anecdote from the Hurricane Katrina response highlights the need to consider cyberspace resilience as part of cybersecurity in order to guide subsequent preparedness efforts.

Lesson Learned: Response Implications of Cyberspace Preparedness and Resiliency

During Hurricane Katrina, out-of-state responders supporting Emergency Support Function 8 (Public Health and Medical Services) immediately faced storm-related outages of commercial wired and wireless communication services. Though some responders had satellite phones, they were not accustomed to using them, and the equipment did not work as planned. Vendor-provided wireless data communication was intermittent at best and often unusable.

Some responders were equipped with lower-bandwidth satellite communication dishes with built-in wireless access points, but most of the equipment had insufficient bandwidth to meet the mission requirements. Connectivity was not acceptable for critical communication needs, and network-connected fax machines were nonexistent. Where stable, higher-speed connections were available—such as at the field command center—minimum security protocols were not observed, allowing viruses to render the networks useless. Eventually, responders were forced to resort to verbal and printed communication.

Despite the expensive equipment, a lack of functional interoperability and adequate security measures prevented capability investments from being useful on the ground during a major response.

²³ McAfee, "McAfee, Inc. Research Shows Global Recession Increasing Risks to Intellectual Property," http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/press/corporate/2009/20090129_063500_j.html (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Rather than thinking of cybersecurity as distinct from other types of threats and hazards, it should be incorporated into the existing national framework of disaster preparedness policy and guidance. In this way, the increasingly consistent preparedness process we envision across the Nation will efficiently improve cybersecurity capabilities, rather than creating a new process in parallel.

Desired Outcomes:

- Cybersecurity capability enhancement is prioritized at the local, State, Tribal, and Territorial levels; and
- National cybersecurity policy is expanded to include considerations for the resiliency of increasingly cyber-dependent preparedness and emergency management activities at all levels of government.

Policy and Guidance

Challenge	There is no consistent, standardized way for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to meaningfully influence the preparedness policy process from initiation to implementation.
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The scope of the preparedness policy challenge requires a comprehensive, multi-tiered solution. In its entirety, a successful solution must achieve three complementary ends. It should:

- Expand the reach and connect existing national and regional advisory bodies to form a tightly coupled preparedness policy advisory system;
- Provide local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials with routine influence across all stages of the preparedness policy process to include policy initiation, policy review, and policy implementation and monitoring; and
- Address broad issues that span the Federal Government, *e.g.*, establishing preparedness doctrine.

Overarching Recommendation	Transform existing advisory bodies into a “networked” preparedness policy advisory system capable of influencing policy from initiation to implementation.
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Recommendation: Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council.

The Federal Government relies heavily on a constellation of approximately 1,000 advisory councils to shape policy outcomes.²⁴ DHS alone maintains 27 advisory councils.²⁵ Two councils in particular are involved in the preparedness-related policy process: the National Advisory Council (NAC) and the

²⁴ General Services Administration, “Federal Advisory Committees Database,” *FACA Database at FIDO GOV*, <http://www.fido.gov/facadatabase/> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). The NAC is a 35-member body established by *PKEMRA* to advise the FEMA Administrator on the policy perspectives of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments; the private sector; and non-governmental partners. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* established the HSAC, which performs a similar function for the Secretary of DHS, but includes the entire homeland security mission spectrum and enterprise.

While FEMA and the NAC are recognized for their preparedness expertise, preparedness policy issues cut across much of the homeland security enterprise and throughout the Federal Government.

Preparedness is the primary engine of homeland security readiness and the subsequent achievement of a more secure, resilient Nation. Because we believe that preparedness is a bridge across all homeland security disciplines, we believe that the body charged with advising the Administrator on preparedness ought to have the explicit ability to coordinate across disciplines and agencies.

With thoughtful modification, Congress could significantly improve the effectiveness of preparedness-related policy advice using existing bodies. The Task Force recommends that Congress transform the existing advisory bodies into a tightly coupled preparedness policy advisory system. This system would better ensure that newly identified needs and novel ideas anywhere within the homeland security and emergency management enterprise are channeled into the preparedness policy process. Furthermore, a more effective preparedness policy advisory system would enable relevant stakeholders to regularly review and reevaluate preparedness policy and processes, and update and modernize validated policies.

The first step toward realizing this vision is to structurally position the NAC to better serve the entire preparedness system. The NAC should be positioned to advise all Federal departments and agencies with a stake in preparedness in addition to the FEMA Administrator. Furthermore, the NAC should be empowered to:

- Call itself into session;
- Set its own agenda;
- Secure timely leadership briefings;
- Receive information from and transmit information to the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs); and
- Engage and advise other Federal departments and agencies on matters of preparedness policy.

Lastly, the composition of the NAC should be expanded to include representatives from other Federal agencies, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and White House participation.

The ***National Advisory Council*** (NAC) should:

- Focus primarily on doctrine and strategy;
- Prioritize issues and policies for systematic review;
- Coordinate with RACs to aggregate and assimilate regional views;
- Manage discussions and issues under review;
- Seek to identify emergent needs and problems through interaction with regions;
- Evaluate how policies work together in practice;
- Assess if policies are achieving their intended ends; and
- Engage in regular futures studies.

Desired Outcome:

- The NAC functions as an intergovernmental focal point and forum for local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal participation in all stages of the preparedness policy process.

Recommendation: Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils.

The second step toward establishing a coherent local, State, Tribal, and Territorial policy advisory system is to transform the RACs. The RACs provide a collaborative, multi-disciplinary forum for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial emergency management preparedness, response, and recovery stakeholders to collaboratively advise FEMA on issues of importance within each region. The Task Force recommends that the RACs become a major conduit for regional participation in the preparedness policy process.

To realize this vision, the RACs must change in two significant ways. First, the RACs should receive policy information briefings directly from the NAC. This would alert the regions to emerging policy issues early in the policy development process. Second, the RACs should be empowered to provide guidance to the NAC membership and embedded detailees (see next recommendation) in order to initiate, shape, and review policy. This two-way informational exchange between the NAC and the RACs would do much to make local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials fuller partners in the preparedness policy process.

The ***Regional Advisory Councils*** (RAC) should:

- Identify policy issues among membership;
- Forward problems and solutions to the NAC for possible dissemination throughout the RACs;
- Focus on practical implications of existing and proposed policies; and
- Link the RAC and Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISCs) for broad regional dialogue.

Desired Outcome:

- The RACs serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that communicate regional, local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives and inform national-level policy decisions.

Recommendation: Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).

As a third step, the policy advisory system should be directly linked into routine policy-making activities. This is best accomplished by embedding four local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials within FEMA NPD for a 12-month rotation.

In this arrangement, various local, State, Tribal, and Territorial agencies and organizations would nominate officials to embed. The NAC would make selections, and these embedded officials would then serve a variety of functions. First, they would inform the NAC membership of emergent preparedness issues at NAC meetings. Second, they would provide NPD staff with a non-Federal perspective in daily policy activities. Lastly, they would actively promote the concerns and interests of the NAC within NPD and other offices.

These first three recommendations achieve complementary aims. In concert, they constitute the basis of a local, State, Tribal, and Territorial policy advisory system.

Detailees nominated to support the NAC should:

- Focus on policy but may evaluate operations when appropriate;
- Never advocate for a policy contrary to the NAC's guidance and priorities and never for the singular benefit of their own jurisdiction or profession; and
- Advise policymakers of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives regarding:
 - Considerations and implications of policies under consideration;
 - Intended and unintended consequences;
 - Linkages between policies, stakeholders, and the real world; and
 - Opportunities for better alignment of policies to make them consistent and complementary.

Desired Outcome:

- Embedded local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials advise their Federal counterparts on emerging policy issues and serve as a conduit through which the NAC and RACs can contribute to and keep informed of national preparedness policy.

Recommendation: Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process.

Experience has taught us that inclusive policy processes result not only in better policy but also in more effective policy implementation. Yet—despite the best efforts of local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal officials—the preparedness policy process remains primarily a Federal endeavor.

The structures and procedures that shape the preparedness policy process too often fail to routinely enlist the expertise and support of the broader homeland security and emergency management enterprise. While the Federal Government often attempts to integrate non-Federal stakeholders into the policy process through task forces and advisory councils, Federal policy-makers most frequently resort to *ad hoc* solutions and informal outreach. Although these initiatives are sometimes effective, they do not address the underlying lack of regular and systematic stakeholder participation in the policy process.

An overarching impediment to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in the preparedness policy process is the ambiguity of the policy process itself. Policy-makers at DHS and FEMA acknowledge that no formal or consistent processes or practices guide policy formulation. Consequently, it remains extremely difficult for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials to participate meaningfully in the policy process.

We recommend that DHS develop and promulgate a clear policy coordination process that engages local, State, Tribal, and Territorial detailees, the NAC, and relevant RACs, among other stakeholders. Task Force members understand that policy-making is, by its very nature, a complex, amorphous process. However, the orderliness of the policy development process has direct bearing on the ability of the

distributed network of local, State, Tribal and Territorial governments to participate as partners in each phase of the policy process. We encourage DHS leadership to look to the Department of Defense, other agencies, and even other countries to develop a more mature, predictable, and routine process-flow for preparedness policy-making.

Desired Outcome:

- DHS establishes a clear, consistent, and efficient preparedness policy process that better balances the Department's need for deliberative flexibility with its need to engage broader elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise in collaborative policy-making.

Recommendation: Engage non-governmental stakeholders in a collaborative policy process.

Preparedness policy has traditionally been formulated by officials from all levels of government with the limited participation of individuals and non-governmental, faith-based, and private sector organizations. Previous efforts to engage non-governmental stakeholders in policy debates have required a significant and sustained commitment from a small fraction of the populace. As a result, government officials have shaped preparedness policy without the perspective and insight of many of the individuals and organizations most affected by the policies under consideration. Critically, the preparedness policy process has lacked an efficient feedback loop with broad segments of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise. Consequently, both policy-makers and non-governmental stakeholders have struggled to bridge the gap between policy intent and the practical implications of policy that become apparent only during implementation.

However, new technologies and processes are dramatically improving the quality, scope, efficiency, and sustainability of Federal efforts to engage non-governmental stakeholders. For example, the *QHRS* pioneered a Web 2.0-enabled "national dialogue" on homeland security policy that we later emulated. A major theme that emerged in the National Dialogue led by this Task Force focused on the imperative of broadening our understanding of the preparedness community and ensuring that the entire community has a meaningful role in the full policy development and implementation cycle. Promising new alternatives are available and should be used to connect government policy-makers with affected stakeholders in every stage of the preparedness policy process. Specifically, we recommend that DHS:

- Continue to employ Web 2.0-enabled "national dialogues;"
- Leverage public-private media partnerships to improve the delivery of preparedness messaging;
- Use decentralized social media technologies to provide access to timely preparedness information; and
- Engage audiences, such as faith-based and community activist groups, most likely to affect improvements in individual, family, and/or community preparedness at the local level.

Desired Outcome:

- Individuals and non-governmental organizations are engaged in a genuinely collaborative preparedness policy process.

Recommendation: Planning-related policy and guidance should ensure that basic emergency plans match community demographics.

As FEMA’s Director of the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination stated in a recent congressional hearing, “If people with disabilities are more thoroughly integrated in local planning, their participation will help ensure that misleading stereotypes do not dilute the effectiveness of emergency plans.”²⁶ A National Dialogue contributor, citing supporting research, reaffirmed this notion, writing, “Maximizing the participation of vulnerable populations in disaster planning and preparedness initiatives and increasing their social capital through organizational linkages and social supports appears to be crucial to increasing their resilience.”

Success Story: Communications as a First Step Toward Inclusive Preparedness

The Northeast Texas Public Health District has employed innovative communication techniques to incorporate special needs populations into the national preparedness effort. This regional public health organization created an accessible emergency information website to deliver preparedness information to people who are deaf, blind, and have limited sight in video and specially designed documents that include Braille translations and large print editions. The website, <http://www.accessibleemergencyinfo.com/home.html>, contains general information regarding 18 emergency preparedness topics in simple, easy-to-understand presentations and documents.

Inclusive communication initiatives of this sort not only equip otherwise vulnerable segments of society with the knowledge to become better prepared but also reflect a more collaborative approach to emergency planning.

Proactive preparedness activities targeted at special needs populations bring a more diverse cross-section of society into the emergency management and homeland security effort. This, in turn, improves the quality and inclusiveness of policies and plans. Local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal levels of government should build on the contributions of the Northeast Texas Public Health District’s website by customizing its free content to the needs of their own jurisdictions.

While references to vulnerable populations certainly apply to people with disabilities within a community, the scope is much broader, and will vary greatly by community. For example, some communities will have greater numbers of people who are elderly, while others will have many children or households living below the poverty line. We firmly believe that basic emergency plans ought to differ substantially by community, based on the composition of that community. And, further, that demographic differences should be addressed in the body of the emergency operations plan, to maximize utility and familiarity and that people from the various demographic groups be included in community planning and policy efforts.

Desired Outcome:

- Communities better understand and account for their unique requirements and plans reflect these realities.

Recommendation: Establish and fund a national, comprehensive mutual aid system based on NIMS.

In the complex, modern-day response environment, no single jurisdiction has the resources to address the full range of threats and hazards. This is particularly true as the current economic downturn has reduced the availability of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial government resources. With this in mind, we recognize that mutual aid will play an increasingly prominent role in national preparedness.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Disability Integration and Coordination, Marcie Roth, Director for the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination, *Caring for Special Needs during Disasters: What’s being done for Vulnerable Populations: statement before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response*, U.S. House of Representatives, June 15, 2010.

Important mutual aid-related efforts are already underway. FEMA has emphasized the development of regionally shared resources. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) serves as a valuable model for interstate mutual aid but is limited to governor-declared states of emergency.

FEMA should work with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders to establish and fund a national comprehensive mutual aid system. The goals of such a system should be to enable all levels of government to tap into extensive resources and assets nationwide to support incident response activities. Mutual aid is often needed for events that are not declared emergencies. For example, National Special Security Events (NSSEs) are typically so large that they require interstate assistance—but they are not declared emergencies, limiting the availability of EMAC mutual aid assistance.

Accordingly, FEMA should work with all levels of government to address the various policy, legal, and operational challenges involved with developing a national-level approach to mutual aid during emergencies and planned events. This will necessarily require a sustained effort on the part of all involved. In the short-term, FEMA should incentivize the development of mutual aid systems through its grant programs.

Desired Outcome:

- Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments efficiently coordinate mutual aid before, during, and in the aftermath of major emergencies and events requiring national or interstate level responses through a national, comprehensive mutual aid system.

Recommendation: Develop a strategic policy planning process to prepare for tomorrow's challenges.

The homeland security and emergency management enterprise should—consciously and deliberately—engage in long-range policy planning. We, as a Nation, must constantly reassess the challenges confronting us and opportunities to address them. Risks are dynamic. Yet, the capabilities required to address these challenges often require significant time and investment to develop. As such, we must learn to apply the same vigor and devotion to the unknown and the inevitable as we do to the known and the imminent.

Collectively, the homeland security and emergency management enterprise should institutionalize a long-range policy planning process. The primary objective of this effort would be to avoid strategic surprise and optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of our preparedness investments. The NAC should serve as the principal forum for this activity. The NAC, when reconstituted, should create a workgroup devoted to futures analysis.

The NAC futures analysis workgroup should seek to identify emerging threats and opportunities, changing risks, and the systems to thwart them, and evolving hazards and how to mitigate them. The NAC workgroup should receive unclassified long-range trend assessments from appropriate members of the intelligence community, collaborate with DHS components and other Federal agencies, and solicit the participation of key members of academia and the private sector as appropriate.

Initially, we recommend that the following challenges receive the highest priority of study:

- Climate change mitigation and adaptation;
- Changing demographics—particularly age, education, and socioeconomic factors;
- Migration—regional, national, and international;

- Aging infrastructure and its implications on resilience;
- Increasing national and global reliance on technology; and
- Interdependency and the potential for cascading and escalating failure.

The need for a disciplined, intergovernmental approach to long-range planning is underscored by the complexity and scope of the challenges confronting the homeland security and emergency management enterprise. The potential for innovative solutions to solve problems that independent government agencies cannot resolve without the cooperation of a host of government and non-governmental partners is similarly apparent. Alaska's broad-based collaborative approach to addressing the challenge of climate change is emblematic of the type of solutions that can only be achieved through long-range assessment and analysis.

Climate Change in Alaska

In September 2007, the Governor of Alaska issued an administrative order directing State agencies to develop an intergovernmental and collaborative strategy to manage the short- and long-term risks of climate change. The mandate of the newly formed Climate Change Sub-Cabinet provides an excellent model for other emerging policy challenges. Alaska's Climate Change Sub-Cabinet:

- Catalyzes good science for informed decision-making;
- Prioritizes interventions for communities most at peril;
- Implements immediate action to stabilize emergent conditions;
- Promotes community participation and preparedness;
- Recognizes the need for regional, national, and international partnerships and agreements; and
- Maintains an open process for participation.

Due to the close collaboration of State and Federal agencies and eager participation of local communities, Alaska accomplished many climate change-related goals with greater efficiency and effectiveness than possible under earlier policies and traditional methods. For example, several coastline stabilization projects began within months, not years.

Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments are likely to confront challenges of increasing scope and complexity with increasing frequency in coming years. The homeland security and emergency management enterprise should institutionalize processes today to prepare for the challenges of tomorrow.

Desired Outcome:

- The NAC futures analysis workgroup performs long-range assessments and policy planning to mitigate the risk of strategic surprise and to optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of preparedness investments.

Capabilities and Assessments

Challenge

While stakeholders across the Nation have been working to improve preparedness, specific, measurable outcomes for these efforts have yet to be defined and assessed.

As a Nation, we have not defined what it means to be prepared. For the past ten years, the homeland security and emergency management enterprise has been working to determine the appropriate outcomes at all levels—local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal. And, while we have made progress toward this end, we believe that the enterprise has now achieved a level of maturity that makes it possible to define preparedness outcomes and the preparedness efforts it will take to achieve those outcomes. Moreover, by defining the outcomes, as well as where each jurisdiction stands relative to those outcomes, we will have established a baseline by which to measure progress.

We uniformly believe that our Nation—and each of the jurisdictions we represent—is significantly better prepared for emergencies than it was on September 11, 2001, or when Hurricane Katrina smashed into the Gulf Coast in August 2005. Each Task Force member can produce *ad hoc* data and anecdotal evidence describing his or her community’s increased preparedness for all-hazard events. However, a method to demonstrate *how much* more prepared we are does not currently exist. We agree that preparedness efforts, and the systems and processes that support them, are sophisticated enough at this point that it is feasible and, indeed, necessary, to weave existing threads together to form the fabric of a cohesive, comprehensive preparedness assessment framework.

One Task Force member remarked about being overwhelmed by the complexity of the mountain of existing preparedness-related data. The Task Force agreed that an effective preparedness assessment framework should *selectively* draw on and incorporate existing elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise. As an example, several grant programs require applicants to draft Investment Justifications (IJs), but these are not tied in any way to subsequent assessment processes.

To address these challenges, we have a vision for how a preparedness assessment framework should work: defining risks; describing capability outcomes; typing and inventorying assets; determining risk-based levels of capability; and establishing more meaningful outcome-focused assessment measures. This framework should be an enduring, collaborative construct, with continuing system improvements made as capability outcomes and measures become better defined.

The Task Force believes that DHS and FEMA have made substantial progress developing and promoting components of such a framework but urge that existing components be modified, augmented, and forged together. As issues such as cost-effectiveness and sustainability have become focus areas for Congress and the Nation as a whole, promulgating an effective preparedness assessment framework will enable homeland security and emergency management stakeholders to continually identify and improve returns on preparedness investments.

Overarching Recommendation

Prioritize development and phased implementation of a national preparedness assessment framework.

Recommendation: Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.

The Task Force believes that every level of government should be able to define its risks—whether man-made or natural. This process can range from a complex risk assessment methodology at the national level down to a simple historical accounting of previous natural disasters for a local jurisdiction.

At the local level, we recommend that every jurisdiction prioritize risks—both man-made and natural. The Task Force believes that localities should be free to use an appropriate methodology or tool to help them collect and analyze baseline risk data. We caution against developing and mandating complex assessment methodologies—complexity has an inverse relationship with participation, particularly at the local level where personnel are often volunteer, part-time, or inadequately staffed. Using the web-based support tool described in a later recommendation, local jurisdictions should also provide their risk analyses to their respective State to enable aggregate-level analysis.

State and UASI jurisdictions should participate in a more rigorous and standardized THIRA process. The Task Force believes that existing State hazard mitigation processes serve as a potential model upon which to base this State/UASI THIRA.

Individual Tribal nations should decide how best to participate in the THIRA process. This could be directly with FEMA, or as a quasi-local jurisdiction reporting to FEMA through the appropriate State government. If acting directly, Tribes should comply with the same standards and timelines as State and UASI jurisdictions.

At the Federal level, DHS should conduct a national-level THIRA using both Federal-level data as well as aggregated data from States and UASI jurisdictions. DHS should disseminate the results of this THIRA to, at a minimum, Federal departments and agencies with lead and support roles for the Emergency Support Functions in the National Response Framework.

This common approach will enable all levels of government to maintain a baseline understanding of the risks that they face, facilitating efforts to identify capability and resource gaps and ultimately capability improvements. We also emphasize that, as appropriate, higher levels of government should share relevant THIRA information that affects other jurisdictions—ensuring that all levels of government are able to accurately assess their risks and fill capability gaps.

Once completed, future grant investments should be tied to assessed risk and existing capability at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, regional, and national levels. Jurisdictions should continue to have the freedom to pursue the capabilities that best address their risks. FEMA should expect State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) and Regional Administrators to comment on Investment Justifications, validating that capabilities requested are consistent with risks assessed at the State and regional levels.

Desired Outcomes:

- All levels of government are able to assess their risks using appropriate methodologies;
- Framework for preparedness Investment Justifications is established;
- Preparedness levels and progress are measured from year to year by evaluating the gaps between current and targeted capability levels across all levels of government; and
- Investments made to close gaps in capability levels result in a more prepared Nation and reflect a measureable return on investment.

Recommendation: Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List with tiered, capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements.

The Task Force recognizes that understanding risks is only one component of an overall preparedness assessment framework. Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders must also be able to identify how their unique risk profiles translate into related capability needs.

While the Task Force acknowledges that FEMA has made significant strides in this area by developing the Target Capabilities List (TCL), additional work remains to make the TCL a more valuable tool for homeland security and emergency management stakeholders. Specifically, the Task Force recommends that FEMA continue its efforts to develop and promulgate Capability Level Guidance (CLG) that provides:

- Descriptions of each capability and its associated outcomes;
- Risk factors to consider in each jurisdiction's respective THIRA process;
- Tiered guidance, based on the jurisdiction's size and complexity, to build a capability; and
- Notional, tiered targets for jurisdictions to consider when developing capability levels consistent with their risk analyses.

The Task Force believes that the preparedness assessment metrics and targets in the Capability Level Guidance should, wherever appropriate, be based on existing standards, such as those from the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).

FEMA is already working to evolve the TCL into the Capability Level Guidance. The NIMS-based CLG is being developed with the understanding that enhanced guidance should enable all levels of government to identify the capabilities needed to address their specific risks. The guidance should likewise enable stakeholders to identify the tiered performance objectives and resource requirements needed for those capabilities. Jurisdictions would then be able to assess themselves against these performance objectives and resource requirements, identifying critical gaps and informing decisions on where to target grant funds and other efforts to augment capabilities.

Aggregating this jurisdiction-specific data into a national-level perspective should enable FEMA to identify national gaps in capability performance and NIMS-typed resources. This would allow FEMA to make informed decisions, in coordination with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments, about how to address those capability performance gaps through, for example, planning, training, or exercising. FEMA would also work with all levels of government to target the procurement and sustainment of critical, nationally deployable, NIMS-typed resources—such as water purification units, heavy-lift equipment, and debris removal resources—to fill identified national gaps.

The capability assessment framework should be integrated into the grant programs as well. Specifically, in their Investment Justifications, jurisdictions should identify how grant funds are being used to develop and sustain capabilities, and then be assessed on the success of those investments.

Desired Outcomes:

- All levels of government are able to assess their capability levels, with associated performance objectives and resource needs;
- FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address capability performance gaps; and

- FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address gaps in nationally deployable, NIMS-typed resources.

Recommendation: Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security and emergency management assets.

The Task Force recognizes that incident response is becoming increasingly complex. No single jurisdiction has all of the resources needed to respond to the broad array of potential threats and hazards.

While Federal departments and agencies understand the resources they have available to support national-level incidents, FEMA—which is charged with coordinating national-level responses—does not have visibility into the number, type, or availability of these assets. In turn, States are unsure of what assets the Federal Government can offer and how quickly Federal agencies can provide them. This challenge is mirrored at lower levels of government, where particular jurisdictions may have nationally deployable assets but no way to share this data with other stakeholders around the country. This lack of transparency results in unnecessary duplication of assets and increases the time needed to determine asset availability and overall cost to all levels of government.

To address this challenge, we recommend that FEMA develop a NIMS-typed resource inventory cataloging nationally deployable assets, such as essential teams and equipment. This process would be closely linked with the resource-related gap analyses supported by the Capability Level Guidance described earlier. The inventory should reflect those specialized assets most likely to be needed in a major disaster but not readily available at the local level. FEMA should manage this inventory in a web-based system that operates with sufficient controls *i.e.*, For Official Use Only (FOUO), and with appropriate transparency at all levels of government, enabling prospective recipients to see included assets and their current availability.

Federal agencies should take the lead in populating the resource inventory; other stakeholders—including from all levels of government and the private sector—should include those specialized response assets that are able to be shared. THIRA processes should also inform the assets included in the resource inventory as should data from historical mutual aid requests. For example, data from EMAC could help identify those most-requested mutual aid assets. This type of analysis is happening in some places, such as California, where the California National Guard has worked closely with CalEMA to type the resources the State most frequently requests, speeding assistance substantially. As has been demonstrated repeatedly, the principles of NIMS—employing a common incident management framework and language—are essential to an efficient response and successful outcome.

Desired Outcome:

- Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders have greater visibility into and access to the range of nationally deployable assets.

Success Story: North Carolina Mitigation and Mutual Aid Efforts for Hurricane and Flood Preparedness

Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North Carolina on September 16, 1999, just 12 days after Hurricane Dennis. Floyd stands as North Carolina's storm of record, and it served as the catalyst for subsequent preparedness efforts that have enhanced the State's readiness posture. The effect of back-to-back storms was devastating: flooding in 66 counties—two-thirds of the entire state; 52 lives lost; 63,000 homes flooded and 7,300 destroyed; millions of agricultural animals lost; 86,954 Federal disaster relief registrants; and more than \$6 billion in damage.

Over the last nine years, North Carolina has received \$279.8 million in Federal grants, which have been combined with millions more in State funds to enhance capabilities in all areas. In 1999, North Carolina was unable to accurately forecast where flooding would occur, hampering mitigation efforts as well as response and recovery. This deficiency led the State to invest in state-of-the-art floodplain maps. Today, a 50/50 investment of State and Federal funds allows flood modeling and impact prediction for structures in any county. In addition to response and recovery benefits, the maps contribute to mitigation efforts by informing decisions to prevent future development in flood-prone areas. North Carolina demonstrated its flood modeling and prediction capabilities in recent preparedness efforts for Hurricane Earl which, thankfully, did not make landfall.

Despite previous flood-related hurricane effects, swiftwater and helo-aquatic rescue teams were also not part of North Carolina's response asset inventory in 1999. Local responders were forced to employ their own personal watercraft to facilitate rescues. Today more than 50 swiftwater teams are distributed throughout the State. Further, a cooperative agreement with the North Carolina National Guard (NCNG) provides helo-aquatic rescue capability ready to meet mutual aid requirements.

North Carolina has aggressively organized around mutual aid and interoperable capability packages. The NCNG has organized their personnel and equipment into typed "mission ready packages" with pre-scripted mission statements to assist decision-makers. The NCNG can readily communicate how many of each mission ready package are available in inventory at any given time, and has developed plans designating which States can supply additional mission ready packages of personnel and equipment through mutual aid. EMAC has adopted this model and the NCNG mobilized several of these mission ready packages in preparation for Hurricane Earl.

In addition, the possibility of flooding that could isolate large portions of North Carolina and compromise critical care facilities for vulnerable citizens stimulated the development of cutting-edge State medical assistance teams (SMATs). SMATs have the ability to establish numerous mobile field hospitals or integrate into regional field hospitals to cover critical care requirements in a post-disaster scenario. This specialized capability is deployable nationwide through mutual aid, and North Carolina SMATs have assisted disaster medical needs in Mississippi, Louisiana, Indiana, and were on alert during Hurricane Earl.

Recommendation: Use existing, familiar, user-friendly systems, such as NIMSCAST, to collect preparedness assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government.

The Task Force was pleased with a number of existing efforts and tools being used to collect and report on preparedness data and resources. Specifically, the Task Force is comfortable with the National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST), which many jurisdictions use to report NIMS compliance information to FEMA. We believe that FEMA should expand NIMSCAST to collect preparedness assessment data. For example, the NIMSCAST system could ask local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders a series of basic questions about their key risks, map these risks to associated capabilities, and use the tiered capability performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements in the Capability Level Guidance to identify capability and resource needs.

For the resource inventory, the Task Force believes that the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS), which is used heavily by the wildland fire community, is a valuable model to consider. ROSS automates resource ordering, status, and reporting processes and tracks all tactical, logistical, service, and support resources mobilized. We were also impressed with FEMA's Logistics Capability Assessment

Tool (LCAT), which we likewise found to be a model worth emulating. We also note that any resource inventory system developed should ultimately be compatible with EMAC, the primary system by which State and Territorial mutual aid is sought and shared.

Incident Management Teams (IMTs) are an excellent example of a collaborative intergovernmental partnership to provide an effective incident management response system that would greatly benefit from a national resource inventory and status system. The Federal and Regional Type 1 and 2 IMTs are national assets used to manage wildland fire incidents and a variety of other all-hazard scenarios. Recently the U.S. Fire Administration worked closely with local agencies, regions, and States to develop over 100 All-Hazards Type 3 IMTs. These All-Hazards IMTs can provide a valuable and cost-effective resource in a timely manner. The Type 1 and 2 teams are managed by the ROSS system and the All-Hazard IMTs are currently only in State-managed resource systems. Having all three types of IMTs in a national resource inventory database would greatly enhance cost effectiveness and efficiency.

Success Story: FDNY IMT Deploys to New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina

At Ground Zero on September 11, 2001, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) faced the most complex, longest-lasting operation in its history. Before that day, the FDNY had never considered the need for substantial, outside support.

On September 12, 2001, the members of two, Type 1 Incident Management Teams (IMT) arrived in New York to support the FDNY Incident Commander.²⁷ An IMT is a comprehensive resource that can either augment ongoing operations by providing infrastructure support or, when requested, transition to an incident management function to include all components/functions of a Command and General Staff.²⁸

While the FDNY initially resisted the assistance, it quickly became clear that the IMT was not attempting to take over and, more importantly, that the teams included experienced, capable personnel, as well as necessary resources, such as radios, that FDNY could employ immediately. The FDNY's experience with the IMTs was so positive that, by 2005, it had developed its own Type 2 IMT and was one of the first to deploy to post-Katrina New Orleans to assist the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD).

The FDNY IMT encountered similar, early reticence in New Orleans. But, like FDNY, the NOFD quickly incorporated the FDNY and other teams into their operations to provide much-needed support to a Department whose personnel had suffered catastrophic losses—80% of the force was left homeless from the storm.²⁹ Like the NOFD, the FDNY IMT endured extremely austere conditions, including little food, no electricity, and no beds, while performing initial duties.

By September 18, 2005, when the initial IMT deployment began to transition to reinforcements, the FDNY IMT was pleased with the initial accomplishments: joint teams had suppressed more than 100 building fires without any serious injuries to operating personnel; and with only one serious civilian injury. Further, numerous fire stations had been cleaned and reopened, many firefighters' homes had been made livable, and electricity and other basic services at the base camp were restored. Since that time, the FDNY IMT has assisted in at least eight other emergencies.

Desired Outcome:

- FEMA provides a system for data collection and subsequent reporting that is transparent, repeatable and defensible.

²⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, NIMS Resource Center, "Glossary," <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/Glossary.shtm#T> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

²⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, "About Incident Management Teams," June 1, 2010, <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/subjects/incident/imt/imt-about.shtm> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

²⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, NIMS Resource Center, "Glossary," <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/Glossary.shtm#T> (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Recommendation: Implement the elements of a preparedness assessment framework over a three-year period, with an integrated set of annual milestones.

We believe that FEMA should implement a preparedness assessment framework as quickly as possible but also recognize that this is a complex undertaking and one that should include feedback from local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders. We recommend a three-year timeframe in which to fully implement a preparedness assessment framework; however, this timeframe includes a series of annual milestones designed to demonstrate progress.

Year One Activities

- FEMA should work with Federal agencies to conduct a national-level THIRA;
- FEMA should institute a NIMS-typed resource inventory system, which is ready to be populated within six months;
- FEMA should finalize tiered performance objective and resource requirement guidance in the Capability Level Guidance within six months;
- FEMA should modify NIMSCAST to enable targeted collection of risk-based capability performance objective and resource data within six months;
- States, Territories, UASI jurisdictions, and Tribes operating independently, should be required to conduct or re-assess existing THIRAs, establishing risk baselines;
- States, Territories, and Tribes operating independently should use the data collected in the NIMSCAST process to assess capability levels using tiered performance objectives and resource requirements from the Capability Level Guidance; and
- All States and UASI jurisdictions should conduct self-assessments using the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) tool as a means to establish their baseline assessment against the national standard.

Year Two Activities

- FEMA grant guidance and associated materials—such as IJs and State Preparedness Reports (SPRs)—should be synchronized with the capability assessment framework;
- States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI jurisdictions should apply for grant funds to address documented capability shortfalls;
- Grant investments should be based upon assessed risk and needed capability;
- FEMA should issue a resource inventory data call to Federal agencies, States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI jurisdictions for nationally deployable assets with existing NIMS resource types;
- FEMA should work with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders to make iterative improvements to the Capability Level Guidance;
- FEMA should expand NIMSCAST’s capability-specific data collection tools to reflect changes to Capability Level Guidance;
- Local jurisdictions, in addition to States, Territories, UASI jurisdictions, and Tribes operating independently, should conduct THIRAs, enabling aggregation at the State, Tribal, Territorial, and national levels;
- States, Tribes, Territories, as well as UASI and local jurisdictions, should use NIMSCAST to assess capability levels; and
- States and Territories should work to ensure that 50% of local jurisdictions have reviewed existing THIRAs or completed new ones, as appropriate.

Year Three Activities (continued annually)

- States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI and local jurisdictions should apply for grant funds to address documented capability shortfalls;
- FEMA should ensure resource inventory data is updated at least annually by all levels of government and the private sector for nationally deployable assets with NIMS resource types;
- FEMA should work with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders to make iterative improvements to the Capability Level Guidance;
- FEMA should refine NIMSCAST’s capability-specific data collection tools to reflect changes to the Capability Level Guidance;
- Local jurisdictions, in addition to States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI jurisdictions, should conduct or re-assess existing THIRAs, enabling aggregation at the State Territorial, Tribal, and national levels;
- Local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and UASI jurisdictions should use NIMSCAST to assess capability levels;
- States and Territories should work to ensure local jurisdictions’ THIRAs are substantially complete nationwide; and
- Federal agency resource data should be fully developed in the national resource inventory.

Desired Outcomes:

- All levels of government develop and maintain an understanding of their risk profiles, associated capability needs, and documented capability shortfalls;
- Grant investments and other preparedness activities are linked to documented capability shortfalls; and
- All levels of government have access to a NIMS-typed resource inventory of nationally deployable assets.

Grant Administration

Challenge

The effectiveness and efficiency of preparedness grant programs are hindered by limited intergovernmental coordination and collaboration, unsynchronized processes, and insufficient linkages with capability assessments.

While we are encouraged by the many positive changes made to Federal preparedness grant programs since the 9/11 attacks, we believe that more can be done to improve grant-related effectiveness and efficiency. Specifically, Federal grant programs would benefit from better coordination and collaboration, targeted process improvements, and closer links with capability assessments at all levels of government.

We have taken a deliberately broad view of what constitutes Federal preparedness grants, using the following definition: “funding designed to establish and sustain a national network of preparedness

capabilities at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and regional levels to allow communities to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all hazards.” At the Federal level, preparedness grant programs are not the sole domain of DHS. The *Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs* identified, for FY2008, 67 “preparedness grant programs,” totaling nearly \$10 billion across seven Federal departments and one agency.³⁰

The increasing use of preparedness grant funding throughout the Federal Government signals the growing awareness of how grant funds can improve preparedness at the local, State, Tribal, and Territorial levels. However, this approach has also caused challenges for stakeholders as grant programs from different Federal agencies support overlapping objectives, have different procedural, administrative, and reporting requirements, and are not linked back to capability assessments.

Overarching Recommendation

Make targeted improvements to preparedness grant-related coordination and collaboration, business processes, and capability assessment linkages.

Recommendation: Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the Federal level.

Better coordination of preparedness grants at the Federal level would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of these programs as they are implemented by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders. In addition to DHS, other Federal agencies such as HHS and DOJ provide grants to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial entities for preparedness initiatives. However, these Federal agencies do not consistently coordinate application, monitoring, financial, or programmatic requirements. Moreover, these distinct Federal agencies do not have visibility into their grantees’ homeland security strategies, existing capability levels, or assessment results. Instead, each Federal agency has only a limited view of the overall preparedness picture within any State or jurisdiction.

While DHS and HHS have sought greater coordination of preparedness funding for the public health and medical sector through a co-led Coordinating Committee, such an effort should be expanded to include all Federal departments and agencies administering preparedness grant funds. This working group should be charged with finding ways to better coordinate all elements of preparedness grant administration—from guidance development through application, monitoring, and assessments.

We particularly encourage Federal agencies to improve coordination in several priority areas. Federal agencies should provide improved visibility into grantee-developed strategic documents, such as State Homeland Security Strategies. These documents can and should be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of grant allocations. In addition, requirements for NIMS resource typing and for use of the Authorized Equipment List (AEL) should be incorporated by all Federal agencies. Lastly, to the extent practical, Federal agencies should seek to better synchronize timelines for preparedness grants and should promote use of *Grants.gov* as a common system for administration of preparedness grants.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Grant Programs Directorate, *Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs: Report to Congress*, 2009.

Desired Outcomes:


- Federal agencies administering preparedness grants meet regularly to coordinate, as appropriate, development of grant guidance, application/award timelines, monitoring, and assessments;
- Federal agencies providing preparedness grants have visibility into grantee-developed strategic documents and use these documents to inform grant allocations and awards;
- Preparedness grant programs reflect more consistent timelines; and
- Preparedness grant programs employ *Grants.gov* as a common system.

Recommendation: Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding preparedness-related grant funds.

Mirroring the recommendation for improved Federal coordination regarding preparedness grant programs, local, State, Tribal, and Territorial jurisdictions should also seek to coordinate their application for and use of these grant funds. For example, different Federal preparedness grant programs often have different SAAs. SAAs often have little or no visibility into how grant funds from other Federal agencies are being used. Improved collaboration among SAAs would ensure better synchronization of grant funds and reduce unnecessary duplication of effort.

Federal grant guidance should encourage such collaboration by offering incentives to form an SAA coordinating body. DHS has required similar efforts by making UASI funds contingent on Urban Area Working Groups which coordinate grant activities in UASI jurisdictions.

More generally, we believe that all stakeholders involved in preparedness grants should participate in a culture of collaboration where intergovernmental coordination continually works to improve grant allocation, administration, and assessment. This high-level vision is depicted notionally below:



Desired Outcome:

- SAAs for all Federal grant programs have increased visibility into grant initiatives, resulting in more efficient and effective use of Federal grant funds.

Recommendation: DHS should evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal preparedness assistance grants to ensure that match requirements do not dis-incentivize local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment.

Match requirements are a typical component of many preparedness-related grant programs. These requirements necessitate that grantees match a certain percentage of Federal grant funds with non-Federal funds. We recognize the importance of these requirements in ensuring that grantees have a shared fiscal commitment in the success of grant-funded initiatives. At the same time, there is increasing concern and anecdotal evidence that—particularly in light of the economic downturn—local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders are foregoing Federal grant funds because they are unable to support the match requirements.

We believe this issue requires more careful study and analysis. We ask DHS to assess the effects of these match requirements on local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation to ensure that the requirements are not hindering those who need grant funds but cannot participate in the grant matching requirement.

Desired Outcome:

- DHS conducts evidence-based evaluation to understand how match requirements influence local, State, and Tribal participation in preparedness grants.

Recommendation: Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions should ensure consistent application of standards.

FEMA has recently initiated efforts to shift grant administration and monitoring responsibilities away from FEMA headquarters in Washington to the FEMA regions. While we are encouraged by this initiative to empower FEMA's regional offices, we wish to emphasize that FEMA—and all Federal departments and agencies—should ensure consistent application of grant administration and monitoring standards, particularly when these functions are decentralized.

Desired Outcome:

- Grant programs are administered and monitored consistently by regional offices.

Recommendation: Allow grantees flexibility to use Federal grant funds to support sustainment and maintenance costs without limitation.

Beginning in 2009, FEMA provided specific guidance that restricted the use of its Federal grant funds for sustainment and maintenance costs. We support FEMA's recent efforts to expand the grant-funded allowability of sustainment and maintenance costs; we believe that these efforts should be expanded.

We emphasize that using grant funds to develop a capability or acquire a critical asset is ineffective if those grant funds cannot be used to sustain and maintain that capability or asset. If we are to see continued improvements in preparedness capabilities, grantees should be incentivized not only to develop capabilities but also to sustain and maintain them. We believe that local, State, Tribal, and Territorial

stakeholders should have the flexibility to use preparedness grant funds for ongoing sustainment and maintenance costs, provided these costs are transparent and justified appropriately.

Desired Outcome:

- Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial grantees are able to use Federal preparedness grants flexibly to sustain and maintain existing capabilities.

Recommendation: *To reflect the diverse goals and objectives of Federal grant programs, preparedness grant funding should be allocated using a variety of approaches, including: 1) baseline amounts for each State and Territory; 2) amounts based on risk formulas targeted to specific areas; 3) category/program-specific grants; and 4) competitive programs that encourage innovation.*

To address the challenges of varied risk profiles, we recommend a mixed approach to allocating Federal preparedness grant funds. The model outlined below largely mirrors the current approach to grant funding—with the notable addition of competitive, project-based grants to promote innovation in capability development and sustainment. We emphasize that all of these grants play important roles in developing and sustaining capabilities.

1. **Block grants to States based, in part, upon population:** Provide funding based, in part, upon population (as done in the early years of the Domestic Preparedness Program). The formula would provide a consistent, base amount on which States, Territories, or Tribes could rely for long-term capability development and sustainment efforts with the flexibility to address their unique needs. The SAA should coordinate all such funds.
2. **Risk-based grants to high risk areas:** Provide funding to emphasize risk-based factors beyond population. Specifically, risk-based grants should consider Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) and the concept of “transferable risk,” which considers the value of CI/KR on a national basis. These grants should be managed at the local or Tribal level or, if requested, by the State on behalf of the local jurisdiction, and coordinated with the SAA.
3. **Category-specific grants:** Maintain existing grants designed for a specific program, discipline, or purpose. These grants should be managed at the appropriate level but should be coordinated through the SAA.
4. **Competitive, project-based grants:** Provide funding to encourage innovation at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and regional levels by funding projects that support and maintain critically needed capabilities and assets that could be shared nationally through mutual aid. Such grants should reinforce the effort to strengthen priority capabilities derived through the national THIRA and capability assessment processes. The purpose of such grants would be the development of nationally available and jurisdiction-managed mutual aid resources. These funds should be offered in addition to existing competitive grants and be coordinated through the SAA.

Desired Outcome:

- Grantees have access to a full range of preparedness grants to meet diverse needs.

Recommendation: More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.

We believe that capability assessment efforts must be more closely linked to grant funding. Currently, these two processes—assessments and grant funding—proceed almost completely independently. While some data used in grant applications and monitoring does inform assessment processes and vice versa, such integration is not consistent. An effective capability assessment framework should support local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

As one example, applicants for certain DHS grants must submit Investment Justifications (IJs). For each proposed investment, IJs describe the estimated cost, the relationship to key strategic documents, *e.g.*, the State Homeland Security Strategy, implementation activities, and the expected impact. IJs are a time-consuming but valuable way to explain the rationale for making a grant-funded investment. Unfortunately, the information provided in the IJs is used solely during the grant application and review process.

We believe that IJs should be used more broadly to inform ongoing grant monitoring and assessment efforts. In the context of a broader preparedness assessment framework, IJs can serve as a resource to assess whether expected outcomes and capability improvements resulted from grant investments. We also believe that progress from year to year should be measured using the IJs as a starting point.

Desired Outcome:

- Assessment data supports local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

Conclusion

When Congress directed that the Task Force “take stock” of preparedness efforts since September 11th, 2001, our mission was not simply to assess *how much* preparedness efforts had bought America. We noted that America is safer and more resilient today than before 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina based on the unprecedented capabilities now available in more places than ever before. But the real heart of our mission was to understand *how well* those preparedness efforts have been achieved. The cost-effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and especially measurability of the investments made not just by Congress, but overwhelmingly by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments, was a central consideration of the Task Force.

We looked toward the future “to be” preparedness system and how to use preemptive activities to reduce the time and costs associated with recovering from disasters that do occur, even in cyberspace, which will allow us to bounce back resiliently in the face of adversity. Recognizing that preparedness is a responsibility that cuts across all stakeholders in the homeland security enterprise, we identified ways that we believe will allow individuals and families to better incorporate preparedness activities into their everyday lives to make their communities safer and more resilient, no matter the size. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we have proposed ways to use existing coordination mechanisms between local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal efforts, as well as the private sector and non-governmental organizations, more effectively, so that mere coordination evolves to a culture of collaboration.

Much of the work to be done will occur within the “as is” preparedness system, refining the processes that have developed since 9/11 to bring the historical disciplines that contribute to homeland security and emergency management together more effectively. Our analyses and proposals reveal the centrality of the preparedness process to the goals of efficiency, sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and measurability. With clearer national-level goals in place, the derivative objectives for individual capabilities can be better defined and their development coordinated among all necessary stakeholders. More uniform usage of common capability types and visibility into a national resource inventory, coupled with improved assessment methods will ease the challenge of aggregating the complex landscape of nationwide preparedness data into authoritative conclusions about progress made, and at what cost in time and resources. Through proposed enhancements to the high-level policy and guidance process, those conclusions can be integrated with global intelligence, including futures analysis, in order to determine new preparedness priorities.

We hope that Congress carefully considers our recommendations. We believe they will make our Nation stronger and better prepared.



Task Force members discuss an issue during the Washington, D.C. meeting (FEMA/Bill Koplitz).

List of Acronyms

AEL	Authorized Equipment List
BSIR	Biannual Strategy Implementation Report
BZPP	Buffer Zone Protection Program
CalEMA	California Emergency Management Agency
CBRNE	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CFDA	Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
CHDS	Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CI/KR	Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources
CLG	Capability Level Guidance
CPG 101	Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101
DEM	Department of Emergency Management
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
DRG	White House Domestic Resilience Group
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMAP	Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FDNY	Fire Department of New York
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FY	Fiscal Year
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSA	General Services Agency (San Francisco)
GSA	General Services Administration (U.S.)
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HSAC	Homeland Security Advisory Council
HSC	Homeland Security Council
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IAEM	International Association of Emergency Managers
IGA	Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (DHS)
IJ	Investment Justification
IMT	Incident Management Team
IRPG	<i>Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs</i>
ISE	Information Sharing Environment
JIC	Joint Information Center
LCAT	Logistics Capability Assessment Tool
LEA	Local Education Agency
LETPP	Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
NAC	National Advisory Council
NEMA	National Emergency Management Association
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIMSCAST	National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool
NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NOFD	New Orleans Fire Department
NPD	National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA)
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NRF	National Response Framework
NSI	Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative
NSSE	National Special Security Event
ODP	Office for Domestic Preparedness (DHS)
OHS	White House Office of Homeland Security
OSDFS	Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (Department of Education)
PKEMRA	<i>Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006</i>
P.L.	Public Law
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive

QHSR	<i>Quadrennial Homeland Security Review</i>
RAC	Regional Advisory Council
RISC	Regional Interagency Steering Committee
REMS	Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools
ROSS	Resource Ordering and Status System
SAA	State Administrative Agency
SAR	Suspicious Activity Reporting
SHSP	State Homeland Security Program
SLGCP	Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
SNS	Strategic National Stockpile
STEP	Student Tools for Emergency Planning
TCL	Target Capabilities List
THIRA	Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment
TICP	Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan
UASI	Urban Areas Security Initiative
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
UTL	Universal Task List
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Appendix A: Recommendations to Congress

Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness

Overarching Recommendation

Consider bold, innovative investments to increase the long-term cost-effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness through cost-reducing measures.

#1: *Include preparedness in the portfolio of strategic, futures-oriented analysis currently conducted by the National Intelligence Council.*

Desired Outcomes:

- The National Intelligence Council integrates preparedness-related futures analyses into its activities; and
- DHS is able to use futures analyses to make authoritative judgments about future requirements and/or capabilities, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.

#2: *The Department of Education, working with FEMA, should develop materials that school districts can use to implement a preparedness curriculum.*

Desired Outcomes:

- School districts around the country integrate preparedness principles and materials into curricula; and
- Citizens entering adulthood understand the preparedness mindset and have taken basic steps to better prepare themselves individually or as a family at home, in the community, and in the workplace.

#3: *Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies.*

Desired Outcomes:

- Governments at all levels increasingly consider and implement innovative financial incentives to promote preparedness; and
- Increasing numbers of individuals and businesses engage in preparedness planning and activities.

#4: *Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and magnitude of disaster recovery.*

Desired Outcomes:

- Jurisdictions take steps—such as those identified in the San Francisco Success Story—to initiate advanced recovery planning efforts; and
- Jurisdictions are able to recover from catastrophic events more efficiently, rapidly, and effectively.

#5: *Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness implications.*

Desired Outcomes:

- Cybersecurity capability enhancement is prioritized at the local, State, Tribal, and Territorial levels; and

- National cybersecurity policy is expanded to include considerations for the resiliency of increasingly cyber-dependent preparedness and emergency management activities at all levels of government.

Policy and Guidance

Overarching Recommendation

Transform existing advisory bodies into a “networked” preparedness policy advisory system capable of influencing policy from initiation to implementation.

#6: *Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council.*

Desired Outcome:

- The NAC functions as an intergovernmental focal point and forum for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in all stages of the preparedness policy process.

#7: *Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils.*

Desired Outcome:

- The RACs serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that communicates regional local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives and informs national-level policy decisions.

#8: *Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in the FEMA National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).*

Desired Outcome:

- Embedded local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials advise their Federal counterparts on emerging policy issues and serve as a conduit through which the NAC and RACs can contribute to and keep informed of national preparedness policy.

#9: *Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process.*

Desired Outcome:

- DHS establishes a clear, consistent, and efficient preparedness policy process that better balances the Department’s need for deliberative flexibility with its need to engage broader elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise in collaborative policy-making.

#10: *Engage non-governmental stakeholders in a collaborative policy process.*

Desired Outcome:

- Individuals and non-governmental organizations are engaged in a genuinely collaborative preparedness policy process.

#11: *Planning-related policy and guidance should ensure that basic emergency plans match community demographics.*

Desired Outcome:

- Communities better understand and account for their unique requirements and plans reflect these realities.

#12: *Establish and fund a national, comprehensive mutual aid system based on NIMS.*

Desired Outcome:

- Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments efficiently coordinate mutual aid before, during, and in the aftermath of major emergencies and events requiring national or interstate level responses through a national, comprehensive mutual aid system.

#13: *Develop a strategic policy planning process to prepare for tomorrow's challenges.*

Desired Outcome:

- The NAC futures analysis workgroup performs long-range assessments and policy planning to mitigate the risk of strategic surprise and optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of preparedness investments.

Capabilities and Assessment

Overarching Recommendation	Prioritize development and phased implementation of a national preparedness assessment framework
<p>#14: <i>Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.</i></p> <p>Desired Outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• All levels of government are able to assess their risks using appropriate methodologies;• Framework for preparedness Investment Justifications is established;• Preparedness levels and progress are measured from year to year by evaluating the gaps between current and targeted capability levels across all levels of government; and• Investments made to close gaps in capability levels result in a more prepared Nation and reflect a measurable return on investment. <p>#15: <i>Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List with tiered, capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements.</i></p> <p>Desired Outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• All levels of government are able to assess their capability levels, with associated performance objectives and resource needs;• FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address capability performance gaps; and• FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address gaps in nationally deployable NIMS-typed resources. <p>#16: <i>Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security and emergency management assets.</i></p> <p>Desired Outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders have greater visibility into and access to the range of nationally deployable assets. <p>#17: <i>Use existing, familiar, user-friendly systems, such as NIMSCAST, to collect preparedness assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government.</i></p> <p>Desired Outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• FEMA provides a system for data collection and subsequent reporting that is transparent, repeatable and defensible.	

#18: *Implement the elements of a preparedness assessment framework over a three-year period, with an integrated set of annual milestones.*

Desired Outcomes:

- All levels of government have an understanding of their threat and hazard profiles, associated capability needs, and documented capability shortfalls;
- Grant investments and other preparedness activities are linked to documented capability shortfalls; and
- All levels of government have access to a NIMS-typed resource inventory of nationally deployable assets.

Grants Administration

Overarching Recommendation

Make targeted improvements to preparedness grant-related coordination and collaboration, business processes, and capability assessment linkages.

#19: *Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the Federal level.*

Desired Outcomes:

- Federal agencies administering preparedness grants meet regularly to coordinate, as appropriate, development of grant guidance, application/award timelines, monitoring, and assessments;
- Federal agencies providing preparedness grants have visibility into grantee-developed strategic documents and use these documents to inform grant allocations and awards;
- Preparedness grant programs reflect more consistent timelines; and
- Preparedness grant programs employ the *Grants.gov* system as a common system.

#20: *Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding preparedness-related grant funds.*

Desired Outcome:

- SAAs for all Federal grant programs have increased visibility into grant initiatives, resulting in more efficient and effective use of Federal grant funds.

#21: *DHS should evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal preparedness assistance grants to ensure that match requirements do not dis-incentivize local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment.*

Desired Outcome:

- DHS conducts evidence-based evaluation to understand how match requirements influence local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in preparedness grants.

#22: *Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions should ensure consistent application of standards.*

Desired Outcome:

- Grant programs are administered and monitored consistently by regional offices.

#23: *Allow grantees flexibility to use federal grant funds to support sustainment and maintenance costs without limitation.*

Desired Outcome:

- Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial grantees are able to use federal preparedness grants flexibly to sustain and maintain existing capabilities.

#24: *To reflect the diverse goals and objectives of Federal grant programs, grant funding should be allocated using a variety of approaches, including: 1) baseline amounts for each state and territory; 2) amounts based on risk formulas targeted to specific areas; 3) category/program-specific grants; and 4) competitive programs that encourage innovation.*

Desired Outcome:

- Grantees have access to a full range of preparedness grants to meet diverse needs.

#25: *More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.*

Desired Outcome:

- Assessment data supports local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

Appendix B: Member Biographies

Charles H. Ada II, Administrator, Guam Office of Civil Defense

Mr. Ada has served as the Administrator of Guam's Office of Civil Defense since 2003, overseeing the island-wide emergency management system. He has served in Guam's Office of Civil Defense since 1993 as an Exercise Training Officer, Emergency Management Specialist and as Chief Planner. Mr. Ada has served through six presidentially declared disasters, one aviation disaster / mass casualty incident as well as numerous localized disasters and emergencies. He is a member of the National Emergency Managers Association and ASIS International.

Karen Baker, Secretary of Service and Volunteering, State of California

Ms. Baker has served as the Governor-appointed Secretary of Service and Volunteering for the State of California since 2008. Prior to this appointment, she served as Executive Director of California Volunteers, also for the Schwarzenegger Administration. Ms. Baker has also lead organizations such as Share our Strength, a Washington DC based anti-hunger nonprofit, and Chrysalis, a nonprofit focused on helping the economically disadvantaged and homeless gain employment. In total Ms. Baker has over 20 years of leadership experience in the service and volunteering sector.

Sheriff John Cary Bittick, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Georgia

Sheriff Bittick was sworn in as Monroe County Sheriff in 1983. Sheriff Bittick began his career as a radio operator for the Monroe County Sheriff's Office in 1972 and today, he runs a full service, nationally accredited law enforcement agency that includes 118 employees and a jail that can house 174 inmates. Sheriff Bittick also developed Sheriff's CARE Cottage, the only nationally accredited child advocacy center operated out of a law enforcement agency in Georgia. Throughout his career Sheriff Bittick has been active in law enforcement associations and criminal justice issues. He served as president of the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA) in 2001 and, since his presidency, Sheriff Bittick has continued to participate in NSA as chair of both the Intelligence Sub-Committee and Legislative Affairs Committee.

Dave Bunce, Fire Chief, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Fire Department

Chief Bunce has led the Salt River Fire Department, a premier "all-risk / full service" public safety organization for the past ten years. Services delivered include fire prevention, emergency medical response (ALS/BLS), fire suppression, rescue, technical rescue, code enforcement, public education, and community partnerships. The Salt River Fire Department delivers service to approximately 92 square miles of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, which borders the greater Phoenix metropolitan area.

Jeffery C. Cash, Fire Chief and Emergency Manager, City of Cherryville (NC) Fire Department

Chief Cash has served as the Fire Chief of the Cherryville (NC) Fire Department since 1986. Chief Cash began his fire service career in 1979. He also serves as the city's Emergency Manager. Chief Cash is an active member of the North Carolina State Fireman's Association, has served on the Board of Directors of the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) for over ten years, and is a member of the NVFC's Executive Committee. In 2007, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) Volunteer and Combination Officers Section (VCOS) honored Chief Cash with the first John M. Buckman III Award for his leadership within the volunteer and combination fire service.

Salvatore Cassano, Fire Commissioner, City of New York

Commissioner Cassano is the 32nd Fire Commissioner in the 145-year history of the New York City Fire Department. He has 40 years of experience in the FDNY and has held every uniformed rank and heads the world's largest fire department with more than 16,000 fire, EMS, and civilian members. Prior to his appointment by the Mayor, Commissioner Cassano served as the FDNY's Chief of Department from 2006 through 2010, overseeing many of the agency's most important bureaus including Fire and EMS Operations, Training, Safety, Fire Prevention and Communications. Commissioner Cassano's extraordinary career with the FDNY began with his appointment as a firefighter on Nov. 29, 1969. Prior to joining the FDNY, Commissioner Cassano served in the U.S. Army from October 1965 through July 1967 and was deployed to Vietnam in September 1966.

T.M. Franklin Cownie, Mayor, City of Des Moines, Iowa

Mayor Cownie was elected Mayor of the City of Des Moines in 2003 and was re-elected in 2007. Mayor Cownie has a long history of public service, having served for two years as an at-large member of the Des Moines City Council, five-terms as the chairman of the Planning and Zoning Commission, and three-terms as chairman of Downtown Des Moines, Inc. Mayor Cownie also serves as a member of the U.S. Conference of Mayors' Stafford Act Reform Task Force, and as Chair of the organization's Metro Economies Committee. Mayor Cownie has been acknowledged nationally for his work on environmental initiatives and climate protection. As mayor, he promotes the city's goal of creating a sustainable green community for future generations, and takes advantage of every strategic opportunity to maintain the city's status as the premier destination in the Midwest for building businesses and raising families.

Nicholas L. Crossley, CEM, Director, Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Johnson County (KS)

Mr. Crossley has served at Johnson County's Emergency Management and Homeland Security since 1999, beginning as a Project Impact Coordinator and then quickly becoming an Assistant Director responsible for all county emergency management plans, hazard analyses, and capabilities assessments. Mr. Crossley was named Director in 2007 and is now responsible for the coordination of all actions within Johnson County which involve preparing for, responding to, recovering from and mitigating the impact of crisis, major emergencies and disasters. Mr. Crossley is also serves as the Region VII President for the International Association of Emergency Managers – USA and Chair of the National Association of Counties – Homeland Security and Emergency Management Subcommittee. Mr. Crossley holds the Certified Emergency Manager credential and a Kansas Certified Emergency Manager credential.

Edward F. Davis, Police Commissioner, Boston Police Department (MA)

Commissioner Davis is the 40th Police Commissioner of the City of Boston. He was sworn in on December 4, 2006. Prior to becoming Commissioner, he served as the Superintendent of Police in Lowell, Massachusetts for 12 years. Commissioner Davis began his career as a patrol officer in Lowell in 1978 and rose through the ranks before becoming Superintendent in 1994. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the National Leadership Award (2002) from the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). Commissioner Davis has served on the PERF board of directors and was a founding member and first President of the Massachusetts Major City Chiefs Association.

Robert DesRosier, Director, Blackfeet Nation Homeland Security Program and Emergency Services Program

Mr. DesRosier currently serves as the Director of the Blackfeet Nation's Homeland Security and Emergency Services Programs. In addition, he manages the Tribal Utilities program. With 16,000 enrolled members, the Blackfeet Nation is the largest Indian tribe in Montana and one of the largest tribes in the United States. The Blackfeet reservation constitutes 1.5 million acres in Montana and has a population of approximately 10,000, including 8,500 enrolled Blackfeet, several hundred Blackfeet descendants and Indians from other tribes, and a few hundred non-Indians. The other 7,500 Tribal members are in various locations all over the world.

Margaret Donnelly, Director, Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services

Ms. Donnelly has served as Director of the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) since 2009, during which time she has focused on items such as promoting vaccination, preventing elder abuse, and improving care for stroke patients with an emphasis on the needs of individual communities. She has also reached out to interested stakeholders across the region to discuss health information exchange. Prior to her role as Director of the Missouri DHSS, Ms. Donnelly served in the Missouri House of Representatives from 2003 to 2008 where she focused on issues related to health care, consumer protection, and child welfare. During this time, she was the ranking member on the House Budget Committee and on the Appropriations Subcommittee for Health and Senior Services, Mental Health, and Social Services. She has also served on the Medicaid Reform Commission.

Ms. Donnelly received undergraduate and graduate degrees in social work and a law degree from St. Louis University. She has been recognized with several awards from the legal community including: the President's Award of Honor from the Women's Lawyers' Association in 2001; the St. Louis County Family Court Guardian ad Litem of the Year in 2002; and the Women's Justice Award in 2006. Ms. Donnelly was elected to the Ferguson-Florissant School board in 1986 where she served until 1992, including one year as president. In 1991 she chaired the committee establishing the first shelter for battered women and children in St. Louis County. She also served as

a commissioner of METRO, as a member of the Regional Airport Governance Task Force, and as a member of the Ecumenical Housing Production Corporation Board (now known as Beyond Housing, Inc.).

Patricia Dukes, Chief of Emergency Medical Services, City and County of Honolulu (HI)

Ms. Dukes has served as Chief of Emergency Medical Services for the City and County of Honolulu since 1994. She serves as a charter board member of the International Association of Emergency Medical Services Chiefs. In addition to these roles, Ms. Dukes is a contributing editor to Elsevier, a leading provider of professional information and online workflow solutions in the Science, Medical, Legal, Risk Information and Analytics, and Business sectors.

Brigadier General Donald P. Dunbar, Adjutant General, Wisconsin

Brigadier General Donald P. Dunbar was named adjutant general of Wisconsin on September 1, 2007. He is responsible for the federal and state missions of the Wisconsin Army and Air National Guard and the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Management. He is also the governor's Homeland Security Advisor and chairs the governor's Homeland Security Council. Prior to his appointment, Brig Gen Dunbar served on the staff of the assistant secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and as executive officer to the director of the Air National Guard. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, the Air Medal, the Air Force Commendation Medal, the Air Force Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze service stars, and the Armed Forces Reserve Medal with bronze hourglass device and M7 device.

Angela English, Executive Director, Texas Governor's Committee on People with Disabilities

Ms. English is currently the Executive Director of the Texas Governor's Committee on People with Disabilities. The Committee works toward a state where people with disabilities have the opportunity to enjoy full and equal access to lives of independence, productivity, and self-determination. The Governor appoints twelve members to serve on the Committee, seven of whom must be people with disabilities. Representatives from six state agencies serve as ex officio or advisory members. The Committee makes recommendations to the Governor and Legislature on disability issues; promotes compliance with disability-related laws; promotes a network of local communities/committees doing similar work; and recognizes employers and media for employing and positively depicting Texans with disabilities. Members of the Committee work on issues related to access, communication, education, emergency management, health, housing, recreation, transportation, veterans and workforce. Her previous experience includes serving for six years as the Accessibility and Disability Rights Coordinator for the Governor's Committee by providing technical assistance regarding accessibility and disability rights laws. She interacted with citizens with disabilities, ADA Coordinators, businesses, governmental entities, and other organizations regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Ms. English also has 13 years previous service with the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation in Mental Health Quality Management. She has a Master's degree from Baylor University in Educational Psychology and a Bachelor's Degree from Carson-Newman College in Jefferson City, Tennessee. Ms. English is a Licensed Professional Counselor and a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist. She has teaching degrees in Special Education and Art Education K-12 grades.

Charley English, Director, Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Homeland Security Advisor

Mr. English was appointed director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) on February 22, 2006 by Governor Sonny Perdue. On September 10, 2007, Governor Perdue also appointed English director of Homeland Security. He currently continues to serve in both capacities. He joined GEMA in February 1996, as part of the Olympic planning team and has served in various leadership positions during his tenure. Director English oversees all state government activities related to Homeland Security and Emergency Management, including responsibilities of the State Fusion Center and Homeland Security Grant Program. During his career, Director English was a member of the G8 Summit security planning team and has coordinated the state's response to eleven (11) presidentially declared disasters and numerous states of emergency declared by the Governor.

Prior to joining GEMA, he was responsible for the management of Georgia's ten regional police academies as director of training for the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Council. Prior to joining POST, he worked with the Clayton County Police Department for eight years serving his last assignment as the regional police academy director. Director English earned his Associate's degree in Criminal Justice from Clayton Junior College,

his bachelor's degree in Public and Urban Affairs from Georgia State University and his master's degree in Homeland Security and Defense from the Naval Postgraduate School where he earned the Professor Phillip Zimbardo Award for academic achievement.

Anthony H. Griffin, County Executive for Fairfax County Virginia

Mr. Griffin was appointed County Executive for Fairfax County, Virginia, in November 1999 and in this role oversees the operations of all of County government. He is a fellow at the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and received the Stone Practitioner Award from NAPA for his commitment to improve intergovernmental cooperation, especially in response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, the anthrax incidents in 2001 and the regional sniper attacks in 2002. Under his leadership, Governing Magazine named Fairfax County "one of the best managed jurisdictions in America" in the Government Performance Project. He served as a U.S. Marine Corps Officer in Vietnam.

Dwight E. Henninger, Chief of Police, Town of Vail (CO) Police Department

Chief Henninger has served as the Town of Vail's (CO) Chief of Police since January 2002, after leaving California's Laguna Beach Police Department as Captain. Chief Henninger began his law enforcement career in 1978 and has risen through the ranks with police departments in the City of Garden Grove (CA), City of Irvine (CA), and City of Laguna (CA). He is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive Committee and is a member of the FEMA Region VIII Regional Advisory Council. Chief Henninger also serves as a board member of the Colorado Regional Community Policing Institute (CRCPI) and Colorado Police Corps.

James D. Himes, Assistant Director, Department of Public Works, Metro Nashville and Davidson County (TN)

Mr. Himes has served as the Assistant Director for Operations since 1986 and has over 30 years of experience with all phases of public works. He has significant experience with emergency management as a result of his work as a Debris Removal Manager in seven presidentially declared disasters, as well as through his leadership of disaster recovery/assistance teams through responses to five in-state disasters. Mr. Himes also served as a task force leader for a Public Works Restoration Team and with an Urban Search and Rescue team for disasters in Virginia (tornado), Kentucky, and Mississippi (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). He is a member of the American Public Works Association and has served in several capacities including three terms on the Emergency Management Technical Committee.

H. Douglas Hoell, Jr., Director, North Carolina Division of Emergency Management

As Director of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (NCDEM) since 2005, Mr. Hoell has leadership and management responsibility over a Division of the N. C. Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. Currently, Mr. Hoell serves as the Chairman of the National Emergency Management Agency's (NEMA) Preparedness Committee. Mr. Hoell has been involved in emergency management at the local, state, and federal levels since 1978. From 1998-2005, Mr. Hoell served as the Assistant Director/Chief of Operations at NCDEM. In that role, his accomplishments included assisting the NC League of Municipalities in developing a management structure for intrastate mutual aid; assisting the North Carolina Department of Agriculture with the development of a plan for response to a foreign animal disease; serving as Deputy SCO for Hurricane Floyd, and for the January 1998 Flood and Winter Storm; as well as serving as State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Leader on Fixed Nuclear Facility Exercises. Mr. Hoell earned his B.S. from North Carolina State University.

Jeffrey D. Johnson, Former Fire Chief/Administrator, Tualatin Valley (OR) Fire & Rescue (TVFR)

Chief Johnson has served as the Fire Chief and Administrator of TVFR since 1995, having served since 1989 as a division chief and then assistant chief. Before joining TVFR, he had an 11-year fire service career in Douglas County (OR). He is the International Association of Fire Chiefs' (IAFC) President and Chairman of the Board. He is a member of the IAFC's EMS, Fire & Life Safety, and Volunteer & Combination Officers Sections as well as the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Association. He also serves on the board of advisors for FireRescue magazine. In addition, Chief Johnson is a representative of the SAFECOM Emergency Response Council and serves as an affiliate to the International Association of Arson Investigators and the National Fire Protection Association. Chief Johnson has authored two fire service books and is a featured guest lecturer across the nation.

Hans Kallam, Director, Colorado Division of Emergency Management

Hans Kallam has served as Director of Colorado's Division of Emergency Management since October 2007. Prior to accepting this position, Mr. Kallam served as Director of Operations for the Adjutant General of the Colorado National Guard. He brings the division more than 25 years of leadership and operations experience – many of which focused on providing support to federal, state, and local authorities. Mr. Kallam has served as a reservist with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and has deployed in response to five separate federally declared disasters.

Mr. Kallam holds a Bachelor of General Studies Degree from Weber State College with concentrations in Police Science, Military Science and Economics and was a Distinguished Military Graduate of the college's Reserve Officer Training Corps program. He has served as the President of the National Guard Association of Colorado and currently serves on the Board of Directors for both the National Emergency Management Association and the Denver Infragard Members Alliance. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, and Master Army Aviator Wings.

Ron Lane, Director of the County of San Diego (CA) Office of Emergency Services

Mr. Lane has served as the Director of Emergency Services since February 2006, including serving as the Director of the County's Emergency Operations Center during the San Diego Firestorm of 2007. He has served the County in several capacities since 1989, having worked with Planning and Land Use, the North County Municipal Court, Public Safety Group, and the Department of Child Support Services. He is a colonel in the United States Army Reserve, and currently commands a transportation group at Camp Pendleton, CA. COL Lane has been mobilized and deployed to the Persian Gulf twice, in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. COL Lane was awarded the Bronze Star in 2004.

Joseph LaPorte, Former Public Safety Director, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians (MI)

Mr. LaPorte has served in law enforcement since 1973, with experience at the local, State, and Tribal levels. He currently serves as the Senior Tribal Advisor for the Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) and was previously detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in conjunction with DHS as the Tribal Representative. His areas of expertise extend to the fields of fraud investigation, internal theft, gaming scams, safety and security, and Critical Incident Management.

Mr. LaPorte's speaking engagements have extended across the Nation. He has delivered keynote addresses at the Michigan State University School of Law on Domestic Violence in Indian Country and Cultural Difference and at the Mason County Sheriff's Department for the Citizen Police Academy. He has additionally served as the keynote speaker for the Ho-Chunk Nation regarding Tribal law and jurisdiction issues and at Johns Hopkins University about intelligence/information sharing and how to bridge the information-sharing gap between Tribal communities and the State/Federal level.

Over the course of his career, Mr. LaPorte has served as a board member on numerous advisory working groups, including CommTech Technical Working Group at the Department of Justice /National Institute of Justice; Enhancing Services to Victims by Police; Major Crimes Task Force of Michigan; and Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board; and has served in various capacities as a representative for Indian Country. He also serves on a wide array of associations, including the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police; National Native American Law Enforcement Association; Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards; and Violence Against Women. In addition, Mr. LaPorte is a board member of Project Safe Neighborhood for the Western District of Michigan and is the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Chairman for the Indian Country Section.

John W. Ledbetter, Executive Director of the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security

Mr. Ledbetter has served as Executive Director of the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security since 2006. In this role, he serves as the Governor's Homeland Security Advisor as well as the State Administrative Authority (SAA) for all DHS preparedness grants and oversees operations of the Mississippi Analysis and Information Center. Mr. Ledbetter also brings with him approximately 30 years of experience in the field of law enforcement. He is a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive Board, National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Advisory Council, and National Governors Homeland Security Advisors' Council (GHSAC).

Pamela L'Heureux, CEM, Director of Emergency Management, Waterboro, Maine

Pamela L'Heureux has been active in emergency management since assuming the position of the Town of Waterboro (Maine) Director of Emergency Management in 1991. She has been a volunteer for the York County (Maine) Emergency Management Agency since 1994. When she retired from Verizon Communications in 2002 after 30 years service, the last 15 in a management role, L'Heureux took on the role of Assistant Emergency Management Director at York County Emergency Management Agency, where she is involved as an emergency management planner, exercise coordinator, and instructor for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) courses. She has been a long-term recovery specialist for FEMA and has responded to more than 20 disasters. Ms. L'Heureux recently took office as President of the USA Council of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM).

Ms. L'Heureux has served as VFW Auxiliary #7997's President, and is a 21-year veteran volunteer fire fighter in her fifth term as Board member of the York County Fire Fighters Association. She is an Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) assessor, and has participated in 10 assessments. She is the first President of the Maine Association of Local Emergency Managers. She currently serves as a member of the United Nation's Advisory Board on International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR).

John W. Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Mr. Madden has served his state and his country for more than 40 years. He was appointed in January 2007 as Director of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management for the State of Alaska following a year as the Deputy Director for Homeland Security within the division.

As director, Mr. Madden has significantly improved the preparedness and the readiness of the State of Alaska. He developed a comprehensive, all-hazard systems approach to community preparedness. He leads the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection, a highly successful public/private partnership. He organized all federal, state, and local governments for the unified defense and protection of the Alaskan energy sector. He developed a highly innovative method to assess vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure, communities, and supply chains. He has designed and conducted several challenging exercises involving threats from terrorism, earthquakes, floods, and extreme weather.

His state service follows a distinguished career in seven federal agencies. Mr. Madden served in the U.S. Army, including twenty months in Vietnam. As a federal civilian, he worked with the Departments of the Navy and Air Force in program and project management. After earning his degree in political science, he joined the Department of Energy working on fossil fuels programs. In Alaska, he served with the National Weather Service and the Federal Aviation Administration. He was a charter member at the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and served with the Transportation Security Administration as Deputy Federal Security Director for many airports in Alaska.

Raymond Orozco, Mayor's Chief of Staff, Chicago IL

Prior to this appointment in February 2010, Mr. Orozco Orozco has served as the Executive Director of the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC). During his tenure at OEMC, Mr. Orozco solidified a private sector camera initiative, which links Chicago based organizations, companies and non-for-profit camera systems into the OEMC video surveillance. Before heading up the OEMC, Mr. Orozco served on the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) for 29 years. He began his career with the CFD in 1980 and advanced to the positions of fire engineer in 1987, lieutenant in 1988 and captain in 1993. Orozco was promoted to battalion chief in 1996 and served in that capacity until his appointment to the position of assistant deputy fire commissioner in 2005.

Jim Page, Executive Director, Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS)

Mr. Page manages the largest law enforcement mutual aid network in the United States, consisting of over 900 local, federal and state agencies. He is responsible for annually managing \$10+ million in grant funds as well as the organization, equipping and planning involved in establishing 11 regional multi-jurisdictional Weapons of Mass Destruction SWAT teams, 10 regional Mobile Field Forces, the distribution of 24,000 gas masks to every officer in Illinois in addition to the establishment and execution of a secured mutual aid system that operates statewide. He reports to a Board consisting of 21 sheriffs, chiefs and directors elected statewide to govern ILEAS.

Mr. Page joined ILEAS in 2004 as the first Executive Director after retiring from the Urbana Police Department as the Assistant Chief of Police with 27 years of service. In addition to the Urbana Police Department, Mr. Page served on the Chatham, Illinois police force. He has a Master's Degree in Public Administration and is a graduate of the 164th Session of the FBI National Academy.

Kerry Pettingill, Director, Oklahoma Office of Homeland Security

Mr. Pettingill has served the people of the State of Oklahoma for more than a quarter of a century. Beginning as a State Trooper in 1982 he has risen in the Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) to his current rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Throughout his tenure, Mr. Pettingill has served in specialized positions utilizing his training as a bomb technician, hazardous materials technician and in tactical operations. He served as commander of the OHP Bomb Squad and Tactical Teams, as liaison to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and Deputy Director of Homeland Security.

Mr. Pettingill serves on numerous professional appointments such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP): State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium: State Administrative Agency Advisory Council, the Governor's Campus Life and Safety and Security Task Force (CLASS), and the Governor's Homeland Security Advisory Council. Mr. Pettingill is a graduate of the 39th OHP Academy, Leadership Oklahoma Class XIX, FBI National Academy, FBI Hazardous Devices School and has his Bachelor of Science from Southern Nazarene University.

Mary Selecky, Secretary, Washington State Department of Health

Ms. Selecky has served as Secretary of the Washington State Department of Health since March 1999 during which time she has made tobacco prevention and control, patient safety, nutrition and physical activity, and emergency preparedness her top priorities on a state-wide level. Prior to working for the state, Mary had a 20-year tenure as administrator of the Northeast Tri-County Health District in Washington. She is a past president of the Washington State Association of Local Public Health Officials as well as the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, where she received the 2004 McCormack Award for excellence in public health. Ms. Selecky also served on the Board of Directors of the National Association of City and County Health Officials.

David Taylor, State Chief Information Officer and Executive Director, Agency for Enterprise Information Technology, Florida

Mr. Taylor has been the State Chief Information Officer and Executive Director for the Agency for Enterprise Information Technology since July of 2008. He reports to the Governor and Cabinet members for the State of Florida. Mr. Taylor was previously the Chief Information Officer of the Florida Department of Health beginning in 2003. This position entailed overall authority for IT services and management for a 17,000 employee organization with 2.5 billion in budget. IT expenditures exceed 60 million dollars per year.

During 2006, Mr. Taylor was the Chairman of the State of Florida CIO Council. In fiscal year 2006-2007, he served as State of Florida representative to the National Association of State CIOs. In 2005-2006 he was the Chairman of the National Association of Public Health Information Technology (NAPHIT). Mr. Taylor holds a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology from the University of Massachusetts - Lowell. He also holds a Masters degree in Public Administration from the University of Central Florida.

Lyda Ann Thomas, Former Mayor, City of Galveston (TX)

Ms. Thomas was elected Mayor of the City of Galveston in 2004 and was re-elected in 2006 and in 2008. Prior to becoming Mayor, Ms. Thomas served three consecutive terms as Elected City Council member for District 4, beginning in 1998. She has served as Chairman and board member/trustee of the The Mainland Center Hospital Board, Galveston Partnership for Better Living, and The Neighborhood Housing Initiative among many others. She has received many honors, including being named a Rotary International Paul Harris Fellow, the American Heart Association Heart Ball Honoree, and the Arts Center Honoree. Ms. Thomas has been acknowledged nationwide for her leadership and stewardship of the citizens during the Hurricane Rita evacuation in 2005 and for her efforts since Rita to plan, prepare and be ready to respond and recover from any future disaster

MaryAnn E. Tierney, Former Deputy Managing Director for Emergency Management, City of Philadelphia (PA)

Ms. Tierney has served with the City of Philadelphia (PA) since November 2006, overseeing a transformation of the City's emergency preparedness program. Previously, Ms. Tierney spent over seven years with the New York City Office of Emergency Management, ending her tenure there as the Assistant Commissioner for Planning and Preparedness. Ms. Tierney has extensive experience coordinating large, complex emergency response operations in the field and at Emergency Operations Centers. She has managed over 60 Emergency Operations Center activations in New York and Philadelphia and regularly responds to large emergencies to coordinate on-scene response activities. Ms. Tierney was responsible for coordinating the debris operation at the World Trade Center site with after 9/11. Ms. Tierney is a principal member of the National Fire Protection Association's Technical Committee on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600) and has served as an adjunct professor, teaching graduate-level courses on emergency preparedness.

Alan Dennis (A.D.) Vickery, Assistant Chief of Risk Management for the Seattle Fire Department (WA)

Assistant Chief Vickery is a 43-year veteran of the Seattle Fire Department. He also currently serves as FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Force Leader of the Washington State Team (WA-TF1). He has worked extensively in operations, assessments, and study to improve capabilities needed to respond to disasters as one of the original 12 members of a nationwide FEMA "Readiness Evaluation Team" to assess USAR teams. Assistant Chief Vickery also chaired a 2001 advisory group to preposition strategic national WMD equipment caches, and the national Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability Committee (IAB) sponsored jointly by FEMA, DoJ, DoE, and DoD. He also served as a member of the Gilmore Commission.

John Wageman, State Hazard Mitigation Officer, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division

Mr. Wageman is the State Hazard Mitigation Officer for the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD). HSEMD plans for and responds to natural and human-caused disasters. The Division helps to coordinate activities before, during and after emergencies through partnerships with local, state, federal and private agencies. As the State Hazard Mitigation Officer, Mr. Wageman serves as the primary point of contact with FEMA, other State and Federal agencies, and local units of government in the planning and implementation of pre- and post-disaster mitigation activities.

John Wheeler, Cabinet Secretary of the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Mr. Wheeler, a member of the New Mexico and Massachusetts State Bars, has extensive experience in both emergency services and the law. He has been chief legal Counsel for the Department of Public Safety since 1997 and is the Governor's Crime Policy Advisor. He has been responsible for drafting many laws in New Mexico including Public Health Emergency Response and DWI and the Sex Offender Registry. Mr. Wheeler also serves as Assistant Chief of the Santa Fe County Fire Department, is an Emergency Medical Technician, and a member of Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One which deployed in 2005 to assist after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

State Senator Thomas Wyss, Indiana State Senate

Senator Wyss has served as an Indiana State Senator since 1985, representing District 15. He previously served on the Allen County Council from 1978 to 1985. He is chairman of the Homeland Security, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs Committee in the Indiana Senate and Ranking Member of the Rules and Procedures Committee. He is the Co-chair, Homeland Security and Preparedness Task Force of the National Conference of State Legislatures, serves as a Member of the State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee for the Homeland Security Advisory Council, and is a member of the National Homeland Security Consortium and U.S. Department of Justice Global Advisory Council. Senator Wyss also served as a Lieutenant Colonel with the Indiana Air National Guard, retiring in 1997.

Appendix C: National Dialogue on Preparedness

While the Task Force membership represents a variety of perspectives from across homeland security and emergency management disciplines, we recognized the need to incorporate an even broader range of stakeholders—including the private sector, non-governmental and voluntary organizations, citizens, and additional governmental partners—in our deliberations. To do this, we actively reached out to the national preparedness community to solicit their input.

In early summer 2010, we launched the National Dialogue on Preparedness, a public outreach campaign to link the Task Force with preparedness-minded citizens, non-governmental organizations, and private sector partners. The National Dialogue hosted a number of forums where these stakeholders shared ideas and insights with the Task Force. A key component of this campaign included a series of meetings and teleconferences with stakeholder groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (June), National Advisory Council (July), faith-based and community organizations (July and September), the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (July), and the San Diego Business Alliance (August). These targeted stakeholder engagements generated ideas and recommendations for our consideration.


The Task Force also hosted an online forum for preparedness stakeholders to submit their own recommendations, engage in conversations regarding preparedness-specific issues, and vote on and discuss recommendations from others. On August 5, we launched the National Dialogue on Preparedness website (<http://preparedness.ideascale.com/>).

National Dialogue contributors were asked to respond through the web-based tool to the three core questions posed by Congress and addressed by the Task Force:

- How do we collectively assess our preparedness capabilities and gaps?
- Which preparedness policies and guidance need updating and what process should we use to update them?
- Which preparedness grant programs work the most efficiently and which programs can be improved?



Task Force members participate in a National Dialogue event hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce (FEMA/John Courtmanche).



National Dialogue on Preparedness website (FEMA).

For the 36 days the National Dialogue online collaboration tool was available, 899 users submitted, commented on, and voted on preparedness-related ideas and recommendations. Stakeholders posted a total of 266 ideas, generating 420 comments and 3,297 votes.

We also established a website (<http://www.fema.gov/preparednesstaskforce/>) to post information about the Task Force and provide a dedicated email account (FEMA-Preparedness-Task-Force@FEMA.gov) for stakeholders to directly submit questions and comments. A range of stakeholders regularly submitted comments and questions, to which staff promptly responded and which we incorporated into our deliberations. In total, over 1,000 stakeholders participated and contributed to the National Dialogue.

Key Themes Aligned to Task Force Recommendations

Three core themes that emerged from the National Dialogue align with Task Force deliberations and recommendations:

Integrating Non-Governmental Stakeholders

National Dialogue contributors noted the importance of integrating non-governmental stakeholders into preparedness policy development and implementation. National Dialogue participants specifically mentioned the need to incorporate perspectives from the private sector, faith-based organizations, community-based programs, voluntary organizations active during disasters, schools, the healthcare community (including mental health providers), and organizations that provide services to the special needs/disability communities.

Contributors noted that these stakeholders have the ability to make significant contributions to response and recovery efforts. In particular, National Dialogue participants emphasized that non-governmental partners can support and augment government efforts to disseminate critical preparedness messages. Contributors observed that involving non-governmental partners in preparedness policy development is an essential first step in engaging these stakeholders.

Integrating Preparedness into Educational Curricula

National Dialogue contributors highlighted the importance of citizen preparedness but acknowledged the many challenges associated with engaging the general public effectively. To address these challenges, participants identified educational curricula as an important mechanism for instilling preparedness principles in the public at large. Many contributors also noted that imparting preparedness knowledge to school-aged children would reap long-term gains as children shared their knowledge with their families and peers.

Establishing Financial Incentives for Preparedness

National Dialogue contributors again noted the essential role that individuals, families, communities, and businesses play in preparedness and discussed ways to incentivize preparedness activities. Participants identified the potential for tax and insurance breaks for individuals, communities, and businesses that take preparedness actions. Such financial incentives, contributors posited, would help motivate stakeholders to prioritize preparedness. National Dialogue participants identified certain expenses—such as preparedness supplies for individuals and families, security enhancements and preparedness planning for businesses, and outreach campaigns for communities—that could be incentivized through tax and insurance breaks. Participants agreed that incentive-based approaches were strongly preferable to levying penalties or fines for stakeholders who do not participate in preparedness activities.

